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CASE NOTES
Admiralty - Jones Act Three Year Statute of Limitations Applied to a
Conjoined Count for Unseaworthiness.-The petitioner, a seaman, was
injured on Oct. 19, 1950 as a result of a fall on the respondent's vessel.
On Aug. 27, 1953, almost three years after the occurrence of the injury, a
state court action was filed by the petitioner in a Texas district court. The
bases alleged for recovery of damages were negligence under the Jones Act,'
unseaworthiness, 2 and maintenance and cure under the general maritime law.
The trial court ruled that the petitioner's actions were not barred by the
statute of limitations, nor by laches. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held
that the action for unseaworthiness was barred by the two year Texas statute
of limitations 3 applicable to actions involving a personal injury. 4 The Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari, and, with three Justices dissenting,
held that where an action for unseaworthiness is joined with one under the
Jones Act in a single proceeding, a court cannot apply to the former (unseaworthiness action) a shorter period of limitations than Congress has prescribed
for the latter, regardless of whether the action is at law or in admiralty, in
the state or the federal courts. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357
U.S. 221 (1958).
Before the enactment of the Jones Act, the injured seaman had only two
remedies: the ancient one for maintenance and cure, which is self-descriptive,
and the more recent one for unseaworthiness. 5 The latter was based on the
employer's breach of warranty, implied in the employment agreement, as
to the fitness of the ship and its appurtenant appliances, and liability was
imposed without regard to fault. 6 In 1920, however, with the passage of the
Jones Act, a seaman injured during the course of his employment as a result
of the negligence of the officers or crew members on board ship was given an
additional action.7 There was, thus, a variation in the requisites of each
action, as well as a variation in the origin of each remedy. Whether the
remedies were distinct, overlapping, or concurrent presented a troublesome
problem both to the courts and the litigants involved.8 There is no doubt that
1. Merchant Marine Act § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
2. See Daniels v. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 120 F. Supp. 96, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1954): "The
mere presence of grease or oil or other transitory substance on a deck of a vessel, causing
one to slip and sustain injuries has been held not to constitute unseaworthiness." The
court makes a distinction between a "transitory unsafe condition" (not unseaworthiness)
and an "inherently defective condition" (unseaworthiness).
3. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5526, § 6 (1952).
4. 290 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
5. The seaman's right to damages for personal injuries due to the unseaworthy condition
of his employer's vessel was first recognized in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
6. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 90-94 (1946); The Osceola, supra note 5.
7. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952); 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51
(1952).

8. For the different interpretations as to their relationship to one another, see Premeaux
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 144 Tex. 558, 192 S.W.2d 138, 142 (1946), where the court
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the Jones Act created a so-called cumulative right and remedy. 9 However,
due to the practice which evolved of joining these two causes of action, the
plaintiff created numerous procedural traps for himself.' 0 More significant was
the fact that there was a definite period (three years) of limitations under
the Jones Act,'1 while the action for unseaworthiness was limited only by the
vague and discretionary 2 admiralty doctrine of laches. 13 This made inevitable
the type of conflict involved in the instant case.14
Another underlying, but nonethelegs primary, source of confusion is the varistated: "And the failure [of an employer] to furnish such maintenance and care [to a
seaman who is injured or becomes ill during a voyage], during such time as the duty exists,
is a personal injury for which recovery may be had under the Jones Act." See also Cortes
v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932); McCarthy v. American E. Co., 175 F.2d
727 (3d Cir. 1949); and Jenkins v. Roderick, 156 F. Supp. 299, 304 (D. Mass. 1957), where
that court stated: "If the seaman prevails on the Jones Act or unseaworthiness count and
gets judgment upon all types of damage available to him ... there is nothing left for him
to recover on account of cure and maintenance up to the time of the trial, at least."
9. That is, the right of action created by the statute was in addition to the remedy
based on unseaworthiness. See, e.g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
10. Gilmore & Black, Admiralty §§ 6-25 (1957).
11. When the Jones Act was passed in 1920, the stipulated period of limitation was two
years. However, by the Act of Aug. 11, 1939, the period of limitation in the Federal Employers' Liability Act was extended in the following language: "No action shall be maintained
under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the cause of action
accrued." 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1952). It became a well established xule
that this amendment also extended the period of limitations of the Jones Act to three years
by reference. See Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 210 (1955), where the Court stressed that the
Jones Act was remedial legislation and should be liberally construed to effect its purpose.
See also Streeter v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 49 F. Supp. 466 (W.D.N.Y. 1942); Gahling
v. Colabee S.S. Co., 37 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1941); and Pope v. McCrady Rogers Co.,
164 F.2d 591, 593 (3d Cir. 1947), where the court stated: "If a plaintiff sues in an action
at law to gain benefits under the Jones Act the three year statute [of limitations] applies,
as libellant admits in this case. It would certainly be an incongruous result if, by heading
a paper 'in admiralty' and calling it a 'libel' instead of a 'complaint' the unequivocal language
of limitation could be escaped . . . . [Wjhen the entire foundation of one's claim is an
enactment by a legislative body which, itself, contains a limitations provision [of thre6
years], it cannot be thought that the legislature would have chosen to give people different
rights under its legislation depending upon the court in which they seek enforcement."
Contra, 3 Benedict, Admiralty § 469 (6th ed. 1940); and 4 Benedict, Admiralty § 612
(6th ed. 1940) where it is argued that "the legislative history of the amendment does not
suggest that there was any thought of extending the time [for bringing suit] under the
Jones Act."
12. Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29 (1951).
13. Compare Henderson v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Pa. 1954) and Untersinger v. Keystone Tankship Corp., 1948 Am. Mar. Cas. 1899 (1948), with Oroz v. American
President Lines, 154 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) and Bonam v. Southern Menhaden Corp.,
284 Fed. 362 (S.D. Fla. 1922), where it was held that since the injured seaman did not
bring his unseaworthiness action in admiralty, but at law, the state statute of limitations
applied and not the equitable doctrine of laches.
14. Gilmore & Black, Admiralty §§ 6-25 (1957).
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ous jurisdictional provisions governing maritime personal injury litigation. The
plaintiff could choose to bring his unseaworthiness action in the state courts.
However, the state forum is mandatory where the plaintiff brings his unseaworthiness action at law and the jurisdictional prerequisites of the applicable
federal judiciary act are not present. 15 The federal district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions in admiralty for unseaworthiness' 6 and also
if the suit is brought at law and a diversity of state citizenship existed between
the litigantsY1' The Jones Act 18 expressly recognized, and indeed required,
concurrent jurisdiction in the federal and state courts.' 9 Where a combined
Jones Act and unseaworthiness suit was brought on the law side (or civil as
distinguished from admiralty side) of a federal court and there was no
diversity of citizenship, the circuit courts were in disagreement 2 as to whether
jurisdiction existed over the conjoined unseaworthiness action. 2 ' Thus, when
15. "The [federal] district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000 exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between: (1) Citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952). This is the well known "saving to suitors" clause which,
besides giving the district court original jurisdiction, "exclusive of the courts of the
States," over an action in admiralty, allows a person to pursue, in any other state or
federal court, any additional remedies available.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1) (1952).
18. The Jones Act was, in fact, a complete and unqualified adoption by reference of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1952). The pertinent part of the Jones Act reads as follows: "[Alnd in such action all
statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in
cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply." 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C.
§ 688 (1952).
19. 62 Stat. 989 (1948), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1952). See Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33
(1926).
20. The dispute revolves around the question of whether unseaworthiness, as part of the
general maritime law, arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1952).
21. Compare Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952), with Paduano v.
Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1955), and Jordine v. Walling,
185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950). For a detailed discussion see Gilmore & Black, Admiralty
§§ 6-62 (1957). Another treatment of this problem is found in Jenkins v. Roderick, 156
F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass. 1957). In this non-diversity case, the court held: "[P]laintiff is
not entitled to go to the jury on his unseaworthiness count by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331
[which gives a federal district court jurisdiction over controversies arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States]. He is, however, entitled to go to the jury on that
count because it is pendent to a Jones Act count." Id. at 304. The court here is utilizing
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction which was applied first in Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S.
238 (1933). Essentially this doctrine states that if the set of facts or grounds which go
to make up a single cause of action involve federal questions, a federal court, having thus
acquired jurisdiction, may decide on all matters involved in the controversy. Therefore,
in Jenkins v. Roderick, supra, the court was reasoning that the Jones Act count involves a
federal question, and that it, combined with a count for unseaworthiness, went to make up
a single cause of action as was held in Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927).
Thus, having acquired jurisdiction by virtue of the Jones Act count, it may render judgment
on thNe unseaworthiness count also.
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the suitor combined his actions for negligence under the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness, different procedures would have to be followed depending on
the forum chosen, although "regardless of the forum where the question arises,
federal law creates the substantive principles governing a cause of action
22
based on unseaworthiness."

The majority in the instant case stressed the point that. it was a practical
necessity for the injured seaman to combine his actions for unseaworthiness
and negligence under the Jones Act in a single proceeding. The majority also
desired to mitigate, as far as possible, the confusing distinctions existing between actions at law and those in admiralty, and to create a uniform time limitation for the pursuit of the allied remedies. In reaching its decision, it relied
heavily on Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips. 23 In that case a Jones Act suit was
held barred by a prior judgment entered against the libellant in a prior action
for unseaworthiness. The court held that the facts as alleged described only
a single wrongful invasion of a single right and, therefore, he was barred from
a subsequent recovery on the grounds of actionable (Jones Act) negligence
by the rules of res judicata. As a result of the Baltimore S.S. Co. ruling, the
seaman was, as a practical matter, compelled to join the two remedies in a
single proceeding. With this established relationship between the actions in
mind, the majority concluded that Congress, having determined the limitation
for an action under the Jones Act,24 could not have its expressed intent in this

27
26
remedial legislation 25 qualified by contrary or limiting state court rulings.

22. Jenkins v. Roderick, 156 F. Supp. 299, 301 (D. Mass. 1957). The doctrine of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) has no applicability here, even though the
action was brought on the law side of the federal court and not in admiralty, as no questions of state law are involved. See Pavlakis v. Seacrest Shipping Co., 136 F. Supp. 553
(D. Md. 1955) involving a Jones Act suit for negligence. See also Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 415 (1953), where Mr. justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion,
stated: "Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, is irrelevant in that unseaworthiness is
a federally created right, so state law on a state cause of action is not an issue." Compare
this with the dissent of the instant case concurred in by Mr. justice Frankfurter.
23. 274 U.S. 316 (1927).
24. Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 39 (1926), where the Court said: "And, as a
provision affecting the substantive right created by Congress in the exercise of its paramount
authority in reference to the maritime law, it [the three year statute of limitations] must
control in an action brought in a state court under the Merchant Marine Act [i.e., the
Jones Act], regardless of any statute of limitations of the State."
25. Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424
(1939); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
26. See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942), where it was stressed
that the common-law defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are
not available in a proceeding in admiralty or under the Jones Act. See also Western Fuel
Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Bogdanovich v. Gasper, 41 F. Supp. 457 (S.D. Cal.
1941); and Frame v. City of New York, 34 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
27. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917), where the majority stated:
"Considering our former opinions, it must now be accepted as settled doctrine that in
consequence of these provisions Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the
maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country .... And further, that in the
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The purpose of the majority holding was to defend and further seamen's rights,
they being traditionally classified the "wards of admiralty".2 8 This could
and universality
only be realized by means of uniform law2 9 and by equality 31
30
in the application thereof to cases involving personal injury.
Mr. Justice Brennan, who concurred with the majority, pointed out that the
state statute of limitations need not be applied here by default as was found
32
practical in other federal cases but rather, following equity practice, an
applicable and analogous limitation should be applied, and the logical choice
should be the one governing Jones Act remedies. As he concluded: "The mis33
chief to be avoided is the possibility of shopping for the forum with the most
favorable period of limitations.

'34

The dissenting opinion stressed the distinctions between the two actions,
particularly as to the liabilities imposed. Emphasis was placed on the fact
that an unseaworthiness action is based upon a breach of warranty of the
employment contract as to fitness of the vessel and its appurtenant appliances,
35
and imposed an absolute liability upon the employer; while under the Jones
Act, actual fault must be shown, and the basis of liability is tortious negligence. 36 This argument does not, however, escape the definitive precedent
of Baltimore S.S. Co. V. Phillips37 which, in effect, welded the actions together.
The dissenters further argued that, in the absence of an express limitation
absence of some controlling statute the general maritime law as accepted by the federal
courts constitutes part of our national law applicable to matters within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction."

Cf. Le Gate v. The Panamolga, 221 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1955).

28. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 246 (1942). See also 4 NACCA
L.J. 242 (1949), discussing McCarthy v. American E. Corp., 175 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1949).
29. See Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921). See also Panama R.R. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920);
Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205 (1917); Westerburg v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 304 N.Y. 545, 110 N.E.2d
395 (1953).
30. "And plainly, we think, no such [state] legislation is valid if it contravenes the
essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the
characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony
and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations. This limitation, at
the least, is essential to the effective operation of the fundamental purposes for which
such law was incorporated into our national laws by the Constitution itself." Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
31. The benevolent attitude of the Court in the instant case can be readily seen by
examining other areas where a different spirit was displayed. See, e.g., Cope v. Anderson,
331 U.S. 461 (1947); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
32. Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940).
33. For example, where a state has a longer statute of limitation than provided in a
federal statute. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Burnette, 239 U.S. 199, 201 (1915).
34. 357 U.S. 221, 230 (1958).
35. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
36. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
37. 274 U.S. 316 (1927).
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imposed by Congress, 38 a federally created right is subject to the applicable
one set down by the state in which the action is brought. 39 However true
this proposition may be in other areas, there is ample authority to the effect
that a state's procedure may not be invoked to alter or defeat a seaman's
rights under maritime law. 40 And lastly, it was contended that Congress, not
the Court, should make such a change. In answer to this assertion, it may
be argued that Congress has expressed its will so far as the Jones Act is concerned and that the Court is simply finding that Congress never intended the
Jones Act limitation to be restricted to the narrow confines of that remedy
alone.
The Court is dealing here with remedial legislation which has become an
integral part of the maritime law, and which is to be liberally construed to
effect its purpose.4 ' Although some may offer the criticism that the Supreme
Court is again legislating, it cannot be denied that the Court's approach is a
realistic one. At the same time, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that
the only firm legal basis for the decision is the Baltimore S.S. Co. precedent,
in the absence of which the position taken by the dissent might have been valid.
It has recently been predicted that the Jones Act will be replaced by unseaworthiness as the important maritime personal injury action. 42 However,
38. Part of the respondents argument concerned itself with the fact that the statute of
limitations which governed the Jones Act was substantive. In opposition are the procedural
type statutes of limitation which are not a part of the right and only effect the remedy.
These are set down by the particular forum involved. The respondent contended that the
action for unseaworthiness was subject to the latter type statute of limitations and cited
the following cases in support: John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583 (1913); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Aderhold, 150 Tex. 292, 240 S.W.2d

751 (1951); Tilliard v. Hall, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 381, 32 S.W. 863 (1895). Brief for Appellee,
pp. 10-13, McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 290 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).

However, upon examining these authorities it will be seen that they are either not in point
or cover situations where there was no applicable federal statute of limitations, and so
the one set down by the state was used by default.
39. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96 (1941);
Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). But see
McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154 (1905) on which the dissent relied to support its argument that since Congress has not stipulated a time limit the state should have this right.
However, in the McClaine case a federal statute without a stated limitation was involved.
Whereas, the remedy for unseaworthiness is part of the general maritime law, a compilation
of court decisions. Therefore, the case may be distinguished on its facts as to the importance
of the congressional silence involved.
40. "Their purpose [the framers of the Constitution in enacting § 2 of Article 3 which
extends the judicial power of the United States to 'all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction'] was not to strike down or abrogate the system [of maritime jurisprudence],
but to place the entire subject-its substantive as well as its procedural features-under
national control." Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924). See also Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).

41. The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936).
42. "Since most courts no longer require an election between the Jones Act and unseaworthiness, a Jones Act count, where available, is usually tagged on to an unseaworthiness
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future litigation based on the decision in the instant case will probably belie
the prediction. The Jones Act has here been given new significance. The
ruling of the instant case assures the seaman that if he includes a count based
on the act, he will have a three year guarantee on his unseaworthiness action.
The next logical step in this judicial course of events is for the Supreme Court
to determine what limitation will govern when an unseaworthiness action is
brought alone. If Congress does not legislate before this question is raised,
the Supreme Court might very well use the decision in the instant case as a
precedent for a further "extension." If Congress fails to act, it will then quite
cogently be argued that congressional silence is the equivalent of acquiescence
in the present decision.
Conflict of Laws - Foreign Tort - Effect of Subsequent Marriage of
Litigants.-Plaintiff brought suit for personal injuries sustained as a passenger
in defendant's auto when it collided with a truck in New York State. Subsequently, but before trial, plaintiff and defendant were married. A motion
for summary judgment by the defendant was granted. The superior court
reversed. The New Jersey Supreme Court, three justices dissenting, reversed,
holding that the subsequent marriage of the parties extinguished the plaintiff's
cause of action even though the action could have been maintained in New York
where the accident occurred. Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141
A.2d 34 (1958).
At common law, neither spouse could sue the other for torts committed before' or during2 coverture. New Jersey courts have held that the Married
4
Persons Act 3 did not remove this ban on torts committed during coverture.
The instant case was the first time that the Supreme Court of New Jersey
was asked to pass on an ante-nuptial tort. 5
count. This is done, however, more from habit than from need; in almost all cases the
pleader would be better off to rely exclusively on unseaworthiness and merely complicates
his case and the proof required by dragging in the Jones Act. It is safe to predict, unless
the Supreme Court reverses its field a second time, that in another ten years the Jones Act
will have become a faint and ghostly echo and the law of recovery for maritime injuries
will be stated in terms of unseaworthiness alone. The law is always improving when one
cause of action is made to grow where two grew before. If such a simplification is to be
the end result of the labors of the Supreme Court, the present large degree of confusion
will not have been too dear a price to pay." Gilmore & Black, Admiralty §§ 6-38, at 31617 (1957).
1. Gottliffe v. Edeiston, [1930] 2 K.B. 378.
2.

Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). See generally McCurdy, Torts Between

Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030 (1930).
3.

N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 37:2-1-29 (1937).

4. Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595 (1954); Von Laszewski v. Von Laszewski, 99 N.J. Eq. 25, 133 At. 179 (Ch. 1926). Accord, Clement v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co.,
13 N.J. 439, 100 A.2d 273 (1953); Hudson v. Gas Consumers' Ass'n, 123 N.J.L. 252, &
A.2d 337 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939).
5. But see Wolfer v. Oehlers, 8 N.J. Super. 434, 73 A.2d 95 (L. 1950).
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Section 5 of the New Jersey Married Persons Act provides: "Nothing in
this chapter contained shall enable a husband or wife to contract with or
sue each other, except as heretofore, and except as authorized by this statute." 6
This provision, appearing in only a few statutes of other jurisdictions, 7 has at
various times been viewed as an incorporation of the common law by reference
or a mere disclaimer of legislative intent to change the rule. 8 The latter
construction is more appealing and would leave the courts free to change the
common-law disabilities unmolested by statute,9 though the former is certainly more traditional.
Recent decisions in jurisdictions denying interspousal suits for post-nuptial
torts have allowed spouses to sue for torts committed prior to coverture.10
Typical of these cases is Curtis v. Wilcox,"i where the British Court of Appeals
reasoned that the cause of action which the plaintiff had against her fianc6
for personal injuries was personal property and, therefore, preserved by the
Married Women's Act of 1882 which reserves to a woman the property with
which she enters marriage.
Could statutory authorization be found in the present case? Section 12
of the New Jersey Married Person's Act provides: "The real and personal
property of a woman which she owns at the time of her marriage.., shall be
her personal property as if she were a feme sole."' 2 In view of the ample
modern authority which considers a cause of action personal property,' 3 the
instant court should have had compelling reasons before disallowing the instant
cause of action. It is doubtful that such reasons existed. In addition, section
7 provides: "If a female party to an action in any court of this state marries
6. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 37:2-5 (1937).
7. See 3 Vernier, American Family Laws §§ 167, 180 (1935). The presence of this
provision has led the New Jersey courts to curtail rather strictly, suits between husband
and wife. See Bendler v. Bendler, 3 N.J. 161, 69 A.2d 302 (1949) (refused to enforce
interspousal contracts at law); Smith v. Smith, 4 N.J. Misc. 596 (Cir. Ct. 1926) (confined
property actions between spouses to courts of equity). But see Clement v. Atlantic Cas.
Ins. Co., 13 N.J. 439, 100 A.2d 273 (1953) (husband's liability insurer); Hudson v. Gas
Consumers' Ass'n, 123 N.J.L. 252, 8 A.2d 337 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939) (husband's employer).
8. Compare Bendler v. Bendler, 3 N.J. 161, 69 A.2d 302 (1949), and Drum v. Drum,
69 N.J.L. 557, 55 Atl. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1903), with Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d
595 (1954); Clement v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 13 N.J. 439, 100 A.2d 273 (1953), and
Hudson v. Gas Consumers' Ass'n, 123 NJ.L. 252, 8 A.2d 337 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939).
9. Cf. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933) (right of a wife to testify in behalf
of her husband); State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 129 A.2d 715 (1957); Cowan, Torts, 10
Rutgers L. Rev. 115, 119-20 (1955).
10. Carver v. Ferguson, 115 Cal. App. 2d 641, 254 P.2d 44 (1953); Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1955); Shirley v. Ayers, 201 N.C. 51, 158 S.E. 840
(1931); Curtis v. Wilcox, [1948] 2 K.B. 474.
11. [1948] 2 K.B. 474.
12. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 37:2-12 (1937).
13. Carver v. Ferguson, 115 Cal. App. 2d 641, 254 P.2d 44 (1953); Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1955); Curtis v. Wilcox, [1948] 2 K.B. 474; accord,
Cusick v. Feldpausch, 259 Mich. 349, 243 N.W. 226 (1932); Mizell v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 181 N.C. 36, 106 S.E. 133 (1921).
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after action brought, the action shall not abate by reason thereof, but shall
proceed to final judgment in the name of the female as plaintiff or as defendant, as the case may be, notwithstanding such marriage."' 14 In light of
the over-all intent of the legislature to liberate married women from the
common-law restrictions, the statute should have been susceptible of a broader
construction in order to give expression to its plain meaning.
There is a growing amount of dissatisfaction with the rule of interspousal
tort disability.' 5 Founded in the mores of earlier society, its theoretical basis,
the legal unity of husband and wife, is no longer realistic. Recognizing this,
the retention of the rule is now often based upon the necessity for preserving
domestic tranquillity. This is a flight from reality. Where there is actual ill
will some courts paradoxically pretend that there is domestic tranquillity because there is nothing on the judicial record to the contrary; and there is
nothing on record because nothing is permitted to be put on record. Further,
it ignores the fact that an insurance company is often the real defendant and
not the other spouse.
The presence of insurance in the present case raises an interesting question.
Almost all interspousal tort cases that have come before the courts involve
insurance.' 6 To preclude collusion by husband and wife against the insurance companies, the New York Legislature, when it amended the Domestic
Relations Law17 to allow interspousal suits, also amended the Insurance Law' 8
to provide that personal liability policies would not cover injuries to a spouse
unless there be a specific clause so providing. However, the New York Court
of Appeals, taking cognizance of a lower court decision 19 to the contrary, has
allowed a wife to recover from her husband's insurer for injuries sustained
in an automobile accident which occurred before their marriage on the grounds
2that the plaintiff's right against the insurer vested at the time of the accident .
The instant court, while noting that spouses are permitted to sue for torts
14. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 37:2-7 (1937). Apparently this provision was enacted primarily to
overcome the common-law rule requiring a married woman to join her husband as a party
plaintiff in any action instituted by her before coverture, Philhower v. Voorhees, 12 N.J.L.
69 (Sup. Ct. 1830), though a search of the record fails to disclose any interpretation of
this section.
15. See, e.g., 1 Harper & James, Torts § 8.10 (1956) ; Prosser, Torts § 101 (2d ed. 1955);
Alhertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 Calif. L. Rev. 461
(1922).

16. Chief Justice Kimball of the Supreme Court of Wyoming, dissenting in McKinney v.
McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 252-53, 135 P.2d 940, 958 (1943), said: "Negligence actions by
wives against husbands, without any noticed exception, have involved automobile accidents,
and have arisen since it has become a common practice for owners of such vehicles to carry
insurance ...."
17. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 57.
18. N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(3) provides: "No policy or contract shall be deemed to insure
against any liability of an insured because of death of or because of injuries to his or
her spouse. ..."
19. Fuchs v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 171 Misc. 908, 14 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 603, 17 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 1939), appeal denied, 259 App.
Div. 731, 19 N.Y.S.2d 311 (2d Dep't 1940).
20. Stonborough v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 292 N.Y. 154, 54 N.E.2d 342 (1944).
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committed against one another in New York, held that the question was to be
determined by the law of New Jersey. The problem involved in this determination is best illustrated by making the case a companion of two New
York decisions which are typical of the reasoning, results, and confusion
existing in this area of the law throughout the country. In Mertz v. Mertz,2 1
decided before the New York Legislature permitted interspousal tort suits,
the plaintiff brought an action against her husband for an auto injury that
occurred in Connecticut where such suits were permitted. The court of appeals
held that the right of a wife to prosecute an action against her husband is a
question of remedy governed by the law of the forum and dismissed the complaint. Subsequent to the amending of the New York Domestic Relations
Law, a plaintiff brought suit against her fianc6 for an auto injury which had
occurred in Massachusetts. The parties were married prior to judgment. The
court of appeals, in Coster v. Coster,2 2 held that the right of a wife to sue
her husband is a matter of substantive law and since the marriage of the
parties had extinguished the plaintiff's right to prosecute the action in Massachusetts, the locus delicti, she could not prosecute the action in New York.
The court dismissed the action without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to
bring the action in another jurisdiction. 23 It is impossible to determine whether
the instant court decided that the public policy of New Jersey precluded the
tribunals of that state from entertaining such an action as did the Mertz case
or whether the court determined the rights of the plaintiff as a matter of
substantive law because it involved the question of the marital disabilities of
two domiciliaries of New Jersey. The latter alternative would be opposed to
the reasoning of the Coster case that substantive questions were to be determined by the lex loci delicti. This distinction is important for if the
instant court were merely denying the availability of a remedy, judgment would
not be on the merits and hence a subsequent action by the plaintiff in New
York would not be barred.2 4 However, if the court decided the issue as one
involving the marital disabilities of two residents, it added a comparatively new
note 5 by removing the conflict of laws problem from the field of torts to that
of domestic relations. It is unfortunate that the court did not give a fuller
consideration to this question. As it stands, the decision only serves to add to
the confusion which has resulted from the dissimilar married women's acts.
21. 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936); 5 Fordham L. Rev. 496 (1936).
22. 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943); 12 Fordham L. Rev. 182 (1943).
23. There appears to be no reason why the court should not have given judgment on the
merits instead of the judgment it did.
24. "The fact that a suitor has been denied a remedy by one state because it does not
afford a remedy for the particular wrong alleged may not bar recovery in another state
which does provide a remedy.' Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 444 (1943).
See Restatement, judgments § 49, comment a (1942).
25. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) which applied the law of the
domicile to an accident which occurred in Idaho. See Ford, Interspousal Liability for
Automobile Accidents in the Conflicts of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement,
15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 397 (1954), where the rule of applying the lex loci delicti is criticized
and argument is made for determining the marital disability according to the law of the
domicile.
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Authority of Secretary of State To Determine

Standards for Issuance of Passports.-Petitioner's application for a passport
was denied in accordance with State Department regulations1 upon his refusal
to submit the required affidavit regarding present and past communist affiliations.2 He thereupon brought suit for declaratory relief, but the district court
granted summary judgment for respondent, and the court of appeals affirmed
by a divided vote. On appeal, 3 the United States Supreme Court, with four
Justices dissenting, reversed, holding that the Secretary does not have the
authority to deny a passport on the basis of alleged communist membership
or affiliation, nor on the basis of a refusal to execute a non-communist affidavit.
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).

A passport is essentially a political document addressed to foreign nations
requesting them to accord the bearer safe and free passage. 4 Although originally
considered merely a convenience and not requisite for travel abroad,5 it is
within the power of the Executive to make it illegal for a citizen to leave the
country without a passport in time of war,6 or presidentially declared national
emergency 7 and such power has been expressly invoked and is in effect at the
present time.8
The traditional rule placing the issuance of passports within the discretion
of the Secretary of State9 has been codified and reads: "The Secretary of State
may grant and issue passports . . . under such rules as the President shall

designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other
person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports."' 1 In Perkins v. Elg,"
1. 22 C.F.R. § 51.135 (1952) provides in substance that no passport shall be issued
to any member of the Communist Party, nor to any person, regardless of their formal
affiliation, who acts under the control of the Communist Party, nor to one as to whom
there is reason to believe will engage in activities advancing the communist movement.
2. 22 C.F.R. § 51.142 (1952) which provides that any applicant may be required to
subscribe, under oath, to a statement regarding present or past membership in the Communist Party, as a part of his application for a passport.
3. Certiorari granted, 355 U.S. 881 (1957).
4. Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy (which the instant court cited as Urtetiqui v. D'Arbel), 34 U.S.
(9 Pet.) 692, 698 (1835).
5. Comment, Authority of the Secretary of State to Deny Passports, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev.
454 (1958).
6. 66 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
7. Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, § 1, 55 Stat. 252, made effective by the President
in Proc. No. 2487, 6 Fed. Reg. 2617 (1941). Even though the emergency then in force
was terminated in 1952, Proc. No. 2974, 17 Fed. Reg. 3813 (1952), this did not affect the
Korean emergency declared in Proc. No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (1950).
8. The existent powers were restated in 66 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952),
which was specifically invoked by Proc. No. 3004, 18 Fed. Reg. 489 (1953). 8 U.S.C. § 1185
provides in substance that when the United States isat war, or during a national emergency,
it shall, subject to limitations and exceptions as prescribed by the President, be unlawful
for any citizen to depart from or enter the United States without a valid passport.
9. Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 942 (1955).
10. 44 Stat. 887 (1925), 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1952).
11. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
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the Supreme Court, while recognizing that the substantive standards a person
must meet to obtain a passport are determined by the Secretary, also indicated
an unwillhigness to interfere with the Secretary's determinations in this matter.
In the instant case, the Court denied that Congress had delegated to the
Secretary the authority to make communist membership or affiliation a valid
substantive ground for denial of a passport. The Court emphasized that the
right to travel is a part of the "liberty" protected by the due process clause
of the fifth amendment, and that any delegated powers which would curtail a
constitutionally protected activity must necessarily be narrowly construed. Although the Secretary's authority in this matter has often been expressed in
broad terms,' 2 the majority concluded that only passport refusals based upon
illegal conduct or non-allegiance' 3 may be regarded as having received congressional adoption through long standing administrative practice. The Court
dismissed the precedents involving the Secretary's use of his .discretion during
wartime as irrelevant,' 4 and held that the existing statutes do not indicate that
Congress intended to grant the claimed discretion to the Secretary.
The dissenting opinion reasoned that if the subject matter of the required
affidavit was relevant to any grounds on which the Secretary may deny a passport, then the regulations were valid.'3 It argued that the intent of Congress in
passing the Immigration and Nationality Act of 195216 was to preserve the
security of the United States by denying passports to those considered to be
security risks. 17 Therefore, the dissenting Justices concluded that the Secretary
was authorized to deny passports to communists and that the regulations in
question were a lawful exercise of the Secretary's discretion.
As the dissent pointed out, the Court's refusal to consider the wartime use of
the Secretary's discretion in determining congressional intent was unwarranted
because the applicable statute requiring a passport for entry or departure is
operative only in time of war or national emergency.' 8 It is hardly reasonable
for a court to restrict itself to a consideration of peacetime precedents in determining the congressional intent in enacting legislation which only becomes
effective when peace no longer exists.
The dissent would appear to be factually correct also in its criticism of the
Court's conclusion that there are only two congressionally approved grounds
for withholding a passport. The Secretary has utilized his discretionary power
to grant or withhold passports throughout our history,' 9 as is evidenced by
12.
13.

See, e.g., 11 Stat. 52, 60-61 (1856).
32 Stat. 386 (1902), 22 U.S.C. § 212 (1952),

provides: "No passport shall be

granted or issued to or verified for any other persons than those owing allegiance, whether
citizens or not, to the United States."
14. The Court cites Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which dealt with
presidential seizure of private property during a Korean war labor strike.
15. Accord, Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
16. 66 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
17. 357 U.S. 116, 143 (1958).
18. 66 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
.19. Brief for Respondent, pp. 32-33 & Appendix C; Report of the Commission on Govemnment Security, 445-82 (1957); 3 Moore, International Law Digest § 512 (1906).
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his peacetime denials of passports to those whom he had reason to believe
desired them for an unlawful or improper purpose. 20 Passports were denied
to communists from 1917 to 1931 as a matter of State Department policy, and
after 1945, they were also denied to those communists whose purpose abroad
21
was believed to be contrary to the national interests.
It would seem reasonable to conclude that Congress did intend to curtail
the continued use of American passports in a manner beneficial to communism.
There have been numerous findings by governmental agencies and independent
committees to the effect that communism today poses a grave threat to our
security 22 and they uniformly conclude that the control of passports is a necessary step in the defense of this country. 23 In the Internal Security Act of
1950,24 Congress, in a formal finding, pointed out that the communist goal
is world conquest, and that unfettered travel is necessary for them to fulfill
their purposes. 25 This legislation, then, was a clear expression of the congressional intent that no communist be issued a passport. The Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, which the President invoked in 1953, was also enacted
to prevent security risks from foreign travel in periods of national emergency
and indicated that Congress approved the discretion of the Secretary. 26 The
majority's reasoning renders the contemporaneous enactments of Congress irrelevant. It would require a specific statement by Congress of the specific
grounds for the denial of a passport, a requirement which is not only unprecedented, but one which would destroy the discretion admittedly vested in
the Secretary of State.
The instant decision enables communists to travel freely under the protection afforded by a United States passport. 27 It is submitted that Congress
intended to authorize the Secretary of State to use his discretionary powers to
control the travel of citizens in the national interest, and in particular to
restrict the travel of members of the communist movement. Although such
20.
21.

3 Moore, op. cit. supra note 19, § 503 (1906).
Report of the Commission on Government Security, 470-75 (1957).

22. Ibid. In Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529 (1954), the Court recognized that
Congress, on the basis of extensive investigation, had made a formal finding, in the Internal
Security Act of 1950, that communism is a world-wide revolutionary movement aimed at
the overthrow of governments of the various nations of the world including that of the
United States, and that travel of communist members, representatives, and agents from
country to country facilitates communication and is a prerequisite for the carrying on of
activities to further the purposes of the communist movement.
23. Jaffe, The Right to Travel-The Passport Problem, 35 Foreign Affairs 17 (Oct.
1956).

24. 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1952).
25. See note 21 supra.
26. United States v. Powers, 307 U.S. 214, 217 (1939). In United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612, 623 (1954), the Court said: "In construing the Act narrowly to avoid constitutional doubts, we must also avoid a construction that would seriously impair the effectiveness of the Act in coping with the problem it was designed to alleviate."
27. Were Kent denied a passport, he could still go to Mexico without a passport, and
travel to Europe via Mexico.
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restrictions may impinge slightly on the right to travel, they must be tolerated
where the overriding requirements of our security demand it. Upon urgent
presidential request, 28 remedial legislation is now pending in Congress.2 9
Constitutional Law - Effect of Possible Federal Prosecution Upon State
Grant of Immunity.-Petitioner, subpoenaed before a New York grand jury,
refused to answer a particular question on the ground that the answer might
tend to incriminate him. The grand jury granted him immunity from prosecution under New York law,' and demanded an answer. Petitioner persisted in
his refusal because the immunity granted did not protect him against federal
prosecution, and he was thereupon adjudged in contempt of court. The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division which in turn had affirmed special term's dismissal of his petition for review. The Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari and, with three Justices dissenting,
affirmed. The fifth amendment does not protect from contempt conviction a
witness who, after a grant of immunity, refuses to testify before a state grand
jury on the ground that his answer might subject him to federal prosecution.
Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
The privilege against self-incrimination is guaranteed to persons under questioning before federal tribunals by the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution, and the constitutions of most states accord similar protection
to those faced with state prosecution. 2 The privilege, however, is inapplicable
where the incriminating matter will not subject the witness to any legal penalty,
as in the case where he is granted statutory immunity from prosecution in
return for his testimony.3
Although state immunity statutes afford full and complete protection from
28. H.R. Doc. No. 417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 20011 (1958).
29. See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 4110, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. thereon, Cong. Quar., Vol. XVT, No. 32, p. 1052 (1958).

(1958), and delay of action

1. N.Y. Penal Law § 2447(1) provides: "In any investigation or proceeding where, by

express provision of statute, a competent authority is authorized to confer immunity, if
a person refuses to answer a question or produce evidence of any other kind on the ground

that he may be incriminated thereby, and, notwithstanding such refusal, an order is made
by such competent authority that such person answer the question or produce the evidence, such person shall comply with the order."
2. U.S. Const. amend. V provides: "No person ...shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law . . . 2" An almost identical provision is found in N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6,
which provides: "no person ... shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself .... "
3. N.Y. Penal Law § 2447(1). See generally N.Y. Penal Law § 2447(2), which pro-

vides: "'Immunity' ...means that such person shall not be prosecuted or subjected
to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which, in accordance with the order by competent authority, he gave answer or

produced evidence, and that no such answer given or evidence produced shall be received
against him upon any criminal proceeding."
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prosecution within the jurisdiction of the state granting such immunity,4 the
Supreme Court in lack v. Kansas5 held that no state has the authority to
immunize a person from federal prosecution in return for testimony given to
the state. In Feldman v. United States6 the Supreme Court decided that in
the absence of complicity between federal law enforcement agents and state
authorities, the evidence elicited from a reluctant witness under a state grant
of immunity may be used against that witness in a federal prosecution. However, the mere possibility that testimony might be used by authorities in
7
another jurisdiction does not impair the legal validity of such immunity.
In the instant case, petitioner, having been precluded from claiming the
privilege guaranteed him by the state constitution8 by reason of the grant of
immunity, attempted to assert his privilege under the fifth amendment to the
federal constitution. It has been settled since Barron v. Baltimore that the
first ten amendments to the United States Constitution restrict the federal
government alone, and, since Twining v. New Jersey,10 it has been accepted
that the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment to make it applicable to the states. The
majority adhered to the Twining decision, and noted further that the result
of a ruling in petitioner's favor would be to render ineffective state investigation of state crimes whenever Congress enacted a criminal statute covering
the same subject."' The Court concluded that such an unrestricted use of the
fifth amendment would destroy for all practical purposes the authority of the
individual states to expose wrongdoing. 2
4. United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931) held that, "ful and complete
immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer is
equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule against compulsory self-incrimination."
5. 199 U.S. 372, 380 (1905). The Court held that the state "could not prevent the
testimony given by the party in the State proceeding from being used against the same
person in a Federdl court . . . ." In the reverse situation, where it was claimed that the
privilege against self-incrimination was violated because certain federal immunity provisions failed to preclude the use in state courts of evidence federally compelled, it was
decided that the immunity provision is not defective because it does not extend protection
beyond its own jurisdiction. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). Cf. Brown v. Walker,
161 U.S. 591 (1896).
6. 322 U.S. 487 (1944). For the test as to whether official federal participation renders
such evidence unusable in a federal prosecution, see Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28
(1927).
7. "The English rule of evidence against compulsory self-incrimination, on which historically that contained in the Fifth Amendment rests, does not protect witnesses against
disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of another country." United States v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141, 149 (1905). But where a witness is examined about an offense for which he
stands indicted in the same jurisdiction the testimony sought comes within the scope
of the privilege against self-incrimination. See Foot v. Buchanan, 113 Fed. 156 (C.C.N.D.
Miss. 1902).
8. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.
9. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
10. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
11. 357 U.S. at 378.
12. Id. at 379.
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The dissenting opinion preferred to remand the case to the courts of New
York because the New York decision was premised upon a holding that the
evidence obtained could not, by reason of the cooperation of federal officers,
be used against petitioner in a federal prosecution. The majority opinion here
suggested that the evidence would be admissible.' 3 The dissent felt that the
New York court should be given the opportunity to reconsider its judgment 14
because the premise was now found to be erroneous.
The minority opinion stressed the dilemma with which the witness is faced.
If he refuses to answer after a grant of state immunity, he may be held in
contempt of court. On the other hand, if the witness should answer, federal
authorities may use such testimony in federal prosecution provided that there
is no complicity between federal authorities and state agents.15 Thus, although
the witness is protected against federal prosecution under the fifth amendment,
and against state prosecution under a similar provision in the state constitution,
he is placed in the precarious position that he may not effectively avail himself
of either remedy.
A resolution of the dilemma may be in the offing. It should be noted that
the Feldman case was a 4-3 decision. 16 Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in the
instant case, indicated some disagreement with the Feldman decision and stated
expressly his opinion that it required reconsideration.lr Mr. Justice Black's
dissenting opinion expressed strong disapproval of the Feldman rule.' 8 It
would be reasonable to speculate that a reconsideration of the Feldman case
by the present Court would result in its reversal. Should this materialize, the
minority's objection in the instant case would vanish, and although a witness
could still not employ the fifth amendment to evade answering questions in a
state proceeding, he would after a grant of immunity be spared the threat
of having such testimony used against him in a subsequent federal prosecution.
However, it is to be noted that the overruling of the Feldman case would, to a
considerable extent, enable the states to hamper federal prosecutions. A state
grant of immunity would not, of course, result in a complete ban of federal
proceedings, but would simply prohibit the use of such testimony in federal
courts. This "compromise" of federal and state interests would really be a
limitation on federal power without any curtailment of state power.
13. Id. at 382. However, it is interesting to note that the New York courts had already
decided that all the state is required to do under its constitutional provision against
self-incrimination is to give immunity against its own processes. Dunham v. Ottinger, 243
N.Y. 423, 154 N.E. 298 (1926).
14. However, the appellate division in the instant case recognized the situation and
stated that, "The solution, at bottom, lies in co-operation in good faith between the two
governments [federal and state] and their judicial and prosecuting establishments, both
of which live in quite the same tradition." The court's decision to compel the testimony,
however, remained unshaken. 2 App. Div. 2d 579, 585, 157 N.Y.S.2d 158, 165 (Ist Dep't
1956), aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.S.2d 913, 141 N.E.2d 825, 161 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1957).
15. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
16. justices Rutledge, Black, and Douglas joined in the dissenting opinion.
17. 357 U.S. at 381.
18. Id. at 384.
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Damages for Impairment of Plaintiff's

Earning Capacity Awarded Without Proof of Prior Employment.-Plaintiff, an opera singer about to make her professional debut was injured as a
result of the defendant's negligence so that she was no longer capable of pursuing her career. Damages were awarded for impairment of her earning
capacity as an opera singer even though she had never sung professionally.
Defendant's motion to set aside the verdict was denied. A fully trained opera
student about to embark on a professional career may properly be awarded
damages for impairment of her earning capacity as an opera singer even though
she has never been employed in that capacity. Grayson v. Irvmar Realty Corp.,
12 Misc. 2d 38, 173 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1958).1
The principal case presents a problem of proving damages with reasonable
certainty in a personal injury case. While rather rigid and formalized rules
control the award of damages in an action on a contract, the nature of the
damages sought in a personal injury case preclude exactness of proof. The
damages awarded to plaintiff in the principal case were objected to on the
ground that they were speculative and uncertain since plaintiff had no history
of past earnings as an opera singer.
Earning capacity does not necessarily concern itself with that which an
individual has earned in the past. "It refers to that which, by virtue of his
training, the experience, and the business acumen possessed, an individual is
capable of earning."12 Although originally considered to be a species of pain
and suffering, 3 the courts have now come to regard the impairment
of one's
4
ability to earn a distinct and separate item of personal damages.
Impairment of earning capacity is usually concerned with the diminution
of the skill of a person already employed in a certain occupation or profession, 5
but even where the injured plaintiff is temporarily unemployed, he may be
compensated for the deprivation of his personal right to exercise that
capacity. 6 Plaintiff's earnings prior and subsequent to the injury are properly
stressed by the courts because they ordinarily comprise the best evidence avail-7
able for computing the diminution of the injured party's earning capacity.
1. Grayson v. Irvmar Realty Corp. is now on appeal in the first appellate department.
2. Texas Elec. Ry. v. Worthy, 250 S.W. 710, 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). "The ability
to earn, and not former or present earnings is the test." Holmes v. California Crushed
Fruit Co., 69 Cal. App. 779, 780, 232 Pac. 178, 179 (1924).
3. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Farmer, 77 Ga. App. 187, 48 S.E.2d 137 (1948).
4. Cameron v. Vandgriff, 53 Ark. 377, 13 S.W. 1092 (1890); Evansville Hoop & Stave
Co. v. Bailey, 43 Ind. App. 153, 84 N.E. 549 (1908); McGarrahan v. New York, N.H. &
H. R.R., 171 Mass. 211, 50 N.E. 610 (1898) ; Rosenkranz v. Lindell Ry., 108 Mo. 9, 18 S.W.
890 (1891); Quinn v. O'Keeffe, 9 App. Div. 68, 41 N.Y. Supp. 116 (2d Dep't 1896); Brown
v. Foster, 1 App. Div. 578, 37 N.Y. Supp. 502 (1st Dep't 1896).
5. Leave v. Boston Elevated Ry., 306 Mass. 391, 28 N.E.2d 483 (1940).
6. Mississippi Cent. R.R. v. Smith, 176 Miss. 306, 168 So. 604, cert. denied, 299 U.S.
518 (1936). Recovery has been allowed where plaintiff's salary has increased rather than
decreased by the time of the trial. Saganowich v. Hachikian, 348 Pa. 313, 35 A.2d 343
(1944).
7. Saganowich v. Hachikian, supra note 6. This court held evidence of earnings to be
merely an aid in determining the diminution of the plaintiff's earning capacity.
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In the principal case, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages
for the impairment of her earning capacity since she was fully trained and
qualified to pursue an operatic career. Evidence of the plaintiff's training and
ability were admitted, the court reasoning that where the amount of damages
cannot be estimated with certainty, "no objection is perceived to placing before
the jury all the facts and circumstances of the case having any tendency to
show damages or their probable amount, so as to enable them to make the
most intelligible and accurate estimate which the nature of the case will
permit. ' 8
The instant court could point to only two appellate decisions, both of which
affirmed without opinion lower court judgments, in support of its holding.9
Neither decision was precisely in point because in each, there was some evidence of past earnings in their field of study, whereas here there was none.
However, the holdings do indicate that the courts will consider the studies,
intentions and capabilities of a person to determine what his future earning
capacity might be even where the plaintiff's success or failure will depend
upon public acceptance.
To recover damages for loss of earning capacity, a plaintiff must prove its
worth with reasonable certainty, for recovery will be denied where the evidence
submitted is too remote, speculative or uncertain.'0 The plaintiff here was
about to enter a profession in which it is rather difficult to predict future
earnings with any exactitude since the future of an entertainer varies with
whim and taste. However, where a person has studied for many years and is
fully trained for a particular profession, and then is deprived of the opportunity
to pursue this line of endeavor, it is certainly proper to allow the jury to consider evidence of studies, training and ability in evaluating the plaintiff's
earning capacity.
8. Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954).
9. McDade v. Fuller Canneries Co., 259 App. Div. 809, 20 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1st Dep't
1940). A financially unsuccessful art student was allowed to submit evidence of her studies
and ability and the court charged the jury that they could consider the evidence in determining whether there had been any impairment of her earning capacity. Magee v. National
Broadcasting Co., 270 App. Div. 754, 59 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 1946), cited in the instant
case 12 Misc. 2d at 40, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 73. The plaintiff, a forty-three year old woman, had
sung as a soloist in her youth. At the time of the accident she was employed in a chorus
but continued to study for operatic solos. The court permitted the jury to consider the
plaintiff's ability and training not only as a member of a chorus but as an operatic soloist,
in determining earning capacity.
10. Gauble v. Central Vt. Ry., 216 Fed. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). Evidence of mere intention to study a course in the future or to pursue a new field has been held improper. The
plaintiff teacher was injured after winning a scholarship for graduate study. Evidence of
future intention for more advance study after her present program was deemed improper in
that they were entirely too remote and speculative. Cauble v. Central Vt. Ry., supra; Freeland v. Brooklyn Heights Ry., 54 App. Div. 90, 66 N.Y. Supp. 321 (2d Dep't 1900); see
Richmond & D.R. Co. v. Allison, 86 Ga. 145, 12 S.E. 352 (1890). Mere loss of opportunity
will ordinarily be considered too speculative and uncertain for recovery. But see Geary v.
Metropolitan St. Ry., 73 App. Div. 441, 77 N.Y. Supp. 54 (1st Dep't 1902), reargued on
another issue, 84 App. Div. 514, 82 N.Y. Supp. 1019 (1st Dep't 1903), aff'd mem., 177 N.Y.
535, 69 N.E. 1123 (1903).
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Several jurisdictions have awarded damages to a party injured while training for a particular profession but who had not at the time of the accident
earned any money in his chosen field. The decisions may be put into two
related categories: the apprentice-trainee, or on the job trainee, and the
student. 1 2 The controlling factor in both would seem to be the time element.
If the plaintiff has just begun his studies when the injury occurs, his future
earning capacity in that profession will be deemed too speculative to warrant
granting him a recovery for its impairment.'" On the other hand, if the student
or trainee has only a few months remaining to complete a three or four year
training period, the court will charge the jury to consider the plaintiff a member
of the profession and to consider his earning capacity in that field. 1 4 "Whether
or not one would earn anything in the future cannot be definitely determined."'15 However, it can be assumed that but for the injury, the plaintiff
under normal conditions would have pursued the profession for which he was
trained and thus could be considered a member of that profession in assessing
damages. 16
In Calihan v. State,17 a New York court following this reasoning, awarded
recovery to a medical student for impairment of his earning capacity as a
surgeon. Future earning capacity of a medical student is generally less speculative than that of an untried entertainer, but the difference is not critical
and several jurisdictions have so held. In Rhinesmith v. Erie R.R. Co.,'8 a
school teacher who was training to be an operatic singer was injured by the
defendant and her voice impaired. The court properly charged the jury to
consider the damage to her earning capacity as an operatic singer. Under
similar circumstances, a Massachusetts court held a voice student entitled to
damages for impairment of her future earning capacity as a singer. 19
It is a generally accepted rule that a minor may recover for diminution
of his future earning capacity during majority.20 The reasoning is that although
11. State ex rel. Pryor v. Miller, 180 Fed. 796 (D. Md. 1910), modified in other respects
by 194 Fed. 775 (4th Cir. 1911); Kalland v. Brainerd, 141 Minn. 119, 169 N.W. 475 (1918);
Howard Oil Co. v. Davis, 76 Tex. 630, 13 S.W. 665 (1890).
12. Briscoe v. United States, 65 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1933) (engineering student); Dafoe
v. Grantski, 143 Neb. 344, 9 N.W.2d 488 (1943) (pre-law student); Calihan v. State, 36
N.Y.S.2d 840 (Ct. Cl. 1942), aff'd mem., 266 App. Div. 815, 42 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't
1943) (medical student); Brink v. Kessler, 310 Pa. 506, 165 At. 836 (1933) (engineering
student).
13. Central Foundry Co. v. Bennett, 144 Ala. 184, 39 So. 574 (1905); Bonnet v.
Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 89 Tex. 72, 33 S.W. 334 (1895).
14. Nicholas v. Maxwell Motor Corp., 237 Mich. 612, 213 N.W. 128 (1927).
15. Dafoe v. Grantski, 143 Neb. 344, 345, 9 N.W.2d 488, 489 (1943).
16. Ibid.
17. 36 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Ct. Cl. 1942), aff'd mem., 266 App. Div. 815, 42 N.Y.S.2d 440
(4th Dep't 1943).
18. 76 N.J.L. 783, 72 Atl. 15 (1909).
19. Halloran v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 211 Mass. 132, 97 N.E. 631 (1912).
20. Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948); Traver v. Eighth Ave.
Ry., 4 Abb. App. Dec. 422 (N.Y. 1867); Lieberman v. Third Ave. Ry., 25 Misc. 704, 55
N.Y. Supp. 677 (Sup. Ct. 1899); City of Miami v. Finley, 112 Okla. 97, 240 Pac. 317
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there is nothing from which to estimate earning capacity, "the jury should
do the best it can, taking into consideration such matters as average earnings.
They can also consider that the child is bright and intelligent and with proper
education may be able to develop high earning capacity in intellectual pur'21
suits."
If an award may be made to a child for impairment where there is no way
of determining future earnings, then certainly the plaintiff in the principal
case, who had expended a great deal of time and effort learning a profession
and had been fully trained at the time of the injury, should be allowed to
submit evidence of her ability, training, and intentions in her chosen career.
Where the ordinary means of proving values are not available, the' 22court
.
"will resort to some practical means that will be just to both parties."
Since it is damage to plaintiff's ability to earn and not his actual loss of
earnings that is being compensated, 23 evidence which is probative of plaintiff's
ability to earn is material. It is submitted that the principal case is sound and
consistent with the certainty requirement in the proof of damages in a personal
injury case.
Evidence - Admissibility of Confession Obtained by Interrogation Subsequent to Indictment.-On February 3, 1957, at 7:15 P.M., defendant,
accompanied by his attorney, surrendered to the district attorney after a previous admission that he had killed the decedent. He was taken into custody
under a bench warrant' issued upon an earlier indictment for first degree
murder. Defendant's attorney departed after he had cautioned the defendant to
reveal nothing other than his name. The defendant was detained and interrogated by the police until approximately 3:30 A.M. at which time he made a
complete confession. The defendant was then arraigned on the opening of court
that morning. Neither physical nor psychological coercion had been employed
against defendant nor had any inducement been offered to him to confess.
Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. On appeal, the New
York Court of Appeals with three judges dissenting affirmed the conviction.
The court held that a confession obtained by pre-arraignment interrogation of
one who has been indicted is admissible as evidence against him. People v.
Spano, 4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958).
The question here determined-whether the interrogation of one in custody
under an indictment for felony, without the presence of counsel and prior to
arraignment would render a confession so obtained inadmissible as evidence
(1925). In most jurisdictions the minor is allowed recovery for impairment of earning
capacity after he has reached majority, but denied the right during minority unless an
emancipated minor.
21. Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout, supra note 20.
22.
23.

Industrial & Gen. Trust Ltd. v. Tod, 180 N.Y. 215, 231, 73 N.E. 7, 12 (1904).
Holmes v. California Crushed Fruit Co., 69 Cal. App. 779, 232 Pac. 178 (1924).

1. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 301.
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against him-heretofore had not been passed upon by the New York Court of
Appeals. The admission of defendant's confession under such circumstances
involved two distinct problems; first, the admissibility of a confession under the
criteria of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 and secondly, the admissibility of
the confession as violative of the right against self-incrimination. 3 Under the
Code, a confession is admissible as evidence unless it was obtained by coercion
or by virtue of an inducement offered by the district attorney that he shall not
be prosecuted for that crime. The New York courts have strictly construed
this provision of the Code. 4 Consequently, the majority allowed the defendant's
contention that he had been illegally detained merely to show that illegal detention does not, of itself, vitiate a confession which is otherwise admissible. 5 In
the instant case, it must be remembered, the defendant was interrogated secretly
while he was in custody pending arraignment.6 It has been argued that secret
interrogation is essential for effective prosecution of criminals, and that if any
brutality be involved it will not be cured or discouraged by excluding the con-.
7
fession but rather by punishment and discipline of the offending police officers.
The New York Court of Appeals has decided that a confession obtained as the
result of secret interrogation is not, for that reason alone, inadmissible. 8
The majority further held that the mere absence of counsel at the pre-arraignment interrogation will not vitiate a confession which is otherwise voluntary.
The majority, in justifying this position, emphasized that the Code guarantees
2.
3.
N.Y.
right

N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 395.
The privilege against self-incrimination in a New York proceeding is guaranteed by
Const. art. I, § 6; N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 10; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 355. The
is not guaranteed in a state court by U.S. Const. amend. V nor by U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1938); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908).
4. See People v. Mummiani, 258 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E. 94 (1932); People v. Scott, 195
N.Y. 224, 88 N.E. 35 (1909); People v. White, 176 N.Y. 331, 68 N.E. 630 (1903).
5. People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192, 192 N.E. 289 (1934); People v. Mummiani, supra note
4; People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927); People v. Trybus, 219 N.Y. 18,
113 N.E. 538 (1916); Balbo v. People, 80 N.Y. 484 (1880). Whereas illegal detention of
itself will not render a confession so obtained inadmissible, such illegal detention will be
considered in determining the voluntariness of a confession. People v. Alex, supra; People
v. Mummiani, supra; People v. Trybus, supra.
The mere fact that the person who confesses is in custody at the time he makes the
confession will not render the confession inadmissible as evidence. People v. Garfalo, 207
N.Y. 141, 100 N.E. 698 (1912); People v. Chapleau, 121 N.Y. 266, 24 N.E. 469 (1890);
Murphy v. People, 63 N.Y. 590 (1876); People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9 (1858).
6. In England, interrogation under such circumstances has been discouraged. Royal
Commission on Police Powers and Procedure Report, 144 (1929), which provides in substance, that after one has been arrested on a criminal charge, the English police are not to
question him except to clarify ambiguities in his voluntary statements. Nevertheless, a confession will not be rendered inadmissible because obtained in violation of this rule. Inbau,
Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 77 (1957).
7. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 851 (3d ed. 1940).
8. People v. Wentz, 37 N.Y. 303 (1867).
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counsel "upon arraignment"9 and since this was a pre-arraignment interrogation there was no violation of defendant's right to counsel under the Code.
The dissent conceded that the confession was admissible under the criteria
of the Code, but maintained that defendant's right against self-incrimination
had been violated since the "defendant ... [was] compelled in the course of a
criminal prosecution to incriminate himself by his own utterances."I' The
dissent employed the term "judicial proceeding" to designate that period after
the indictment had been found,' 1 and concluded that since the privilege was
applicable to judicial proceedings, it was applicable here. However, the term
"judicial proceeding" when used in reference to the privilege against self-incrimination is restricted to those proceedings "where incriminatory disclosure had
been extorted by the constraint of legal process directed against the witness."' 2
Thus, not every proceeding which follows the indictment would necessitate the
application of the privilege. It would seem that the dissent was too liberal in its
use of the term "judicial proceeding." Indeed, the privilege may be applicable
within a loose construction of the term, but this is not necessarily so in every
instance. The proceeding at which the confession was obtained was not a
judicial proceeding involving the exercise of legal process against the defendant.
On the contrary, the proceeding was conspicuous for its absence of any remote
resemblance to a legal proceeding within the scope of the privilege. Consequently, since the privilege did not apply to the proceeding at which the
defendant confessed, the defendant could hardly evoke the privilege to exclude
his confession given therein.
Under the present criteria, the confession of the defendant was properly admitted in evidence against him. Nevertheless, the very circumstance under
which the confession was obtained dictates the need for prohibiting this practice
in the future or at least safeguarding against its unrestricted use. Indeed, the
difference between the instant confession and one which might be extracted
during the course of the trial itself is tenuous. The courts, as previously seen,
will not refuse to exclude a confession merely because it was given while in
9. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 188, 699.
10. 4 N.Y.2d 256, 266, 150 N.E.2d 226, 232, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793, 801 (1958).
The privilege against self-incrimination arose out of the practice of ecclesiastical and
civil courts to compel one who was suspect to appear before the court and testify under
oath against himself. Consequently, evidence against an accused might easily be obtained
by virtue of the legal compulsion employed against him. Such a practice failed to recognize
the distinct judicial nature of the court's function and assigned to it rather the inquisitorial
function of extracting from a witness's own lips evidence which would lead to his conviction. As a result of this confusion, brutal abuses arose in an attempt to obtain evidence
to which the court thought itself legally entitled. Thus, the institution of the privilege was
primarily to remove the reason which led to these abuses, the reason being the right of
the court to compel a person to testify against himself. See 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 7,
§ 2250 for a thorough discussion of the history of the privilege.
11. "A prosecution is commenced.., when an indictment is duly presented by the grand
jury in open court, and there received and filed." N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 144.
12. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 25, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
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custody 13 or as the result of secret interrogation.14 Here the court went one
step further and in so doing came close to denying the fundamental fairness
which permeates our entire system of criminal procedure. 15 The majority,
while conceding that reservations may be entertained in admitting the confession, properly assigned the task of remedying the situation to the legislature. In the light of the abuse which can result from an extension of this
practice, the legislature would do well to define the limits within which the
present practice may be employed.

Federal Taxation - Income Suit for Refund in the Federal Courts.- is
claim for refund of a partial payment of a deficiency assessment levied by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue having been disallowed, petitioner sued
for refund in the United States District Court pursuant to section 1346 (a) (1),
Title 28 of the United States Code. The district court's judgment for the
United States was vacated by the court of appeals which remanded with instructions to dismiss. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States,
with one Justice dissenting, affirmed. The Court held that a taxpayer must pay
the full amount of an income tax deficiency before challenging its correctness
by a suit for refund. Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958).
Under present law, an aggrieved taxpayer has several remedies for contesting
a deficiency assessment levied by the Internal Revenue Service.- Within ninety
days after the receipt of the deficiency notice, he may file a petition with the
Tax Court for a judicial redetermination of his tax liability prior to payment.2
The taxpayer may elect to pay the deficiency assessment and then attempt to
recover the alleged overpayment in the Court of Claims or in the district
courts. 3 Finally, an action may be brought personally against the district
director to whom the tax was paid.4
The problem in the instant case centered around the significance of the
terms "any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected under the internal-revenue laws" as set forth in the jurisdictional
13. People v. Garfalo, 207 N.Y. 141, 190 N.E. 698 (1912); People v. Chapleau, 121
N.Y. 266, 24 N.E. 469 (1890); Murphy v. People, 63 N.Y. 590 (1876); People v. Rogers,

18 N.Y. 9 (1858).
14. People v. Wentz, 37 N.Y. 303 (1867).
15. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278

(1936).
1. See 10 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 58A.18, at 46 (1958).
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6212-13.
3. See 3 Rabkin &Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation § 72.04 (1956).
4. This action is based on common-law assumpsit for money had and received. An informative treatment of this subject is given in Plumb, Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors
of Internal Revenue, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 685 (1947). Collector suits can now be brought
against the Directors of Internal Revenue. See Brodsky, Suits for Refund: The Nature of
the Suit and the Procedure To Be Followed, Eleventh Annual N.Y.U. Institute on Federal
Taxation 749 (1953).
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statute, section 1346(a) (1) of title 28 United States Code. 5 Does the payment
of "any sum" comprehend only complete payment of a deficiency assessment
before the district courts may entertain suit for a refund?
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Chief Justice Warren declared that the
language of section 1346 (a) (1) could be termed "a clear authorization to sue
for the refund of 'any sum.' "6 Despite this admittedly lucid provision, the
Court found ambiguity therein because of the "principle of strict construction
to waivers of sovereign immunity... and the sharp division of opinion among
the lower courts on the meaning of the pertinent statutory language .... "
The Court therefore declined to accept the plain meaning with its "clear
authorization." It chose instead to delve into the congressional intent by "a
thorough consideration of the relevant legislative history. . . ."8 Since the
language of the jurisdictional statute is essentially similar to that found in the
claim-for-refund statute, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 7422 (a),9 and
its predecessor, Revised Statutes section 3226 (1875),10 the Court asserted that
5. As amended, ch. 648, § 1, 68 Stat. 589 (1954):
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of
Claims, of:
"(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue
tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in
any manner wrongfully collected under the internal revenue laws. . . ." As amended, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1) (Supp. V, 1958).
6. 357 U.S. at 65.
7. Ibid. The fact that the lower courts disagreed in their findings as to the significance
of statutory provisions does not necessarily denote the presence of ambiguity in the
statutes. If the Court's contention is true, then almost all legislation brought before the
Supreme Court could be said to be somewhat ambiguous.
8. Ibid. Mr. Justice Brown commented in Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 419-21
(1899), that "the general rule is perfectly well settled that, where a statute is of doubtful
meaning and susceptible upon its face of two constructions, the court may look into prior
and contemporaneous acts, the reasons which induced the act in question, the mischiefs intended to be remedied, the extraneous circumstances, and the purpose intendid to be accomplished by it, to determine its proper construction. But where the act is clear upon
its face, and when standing alone it is fairly susceptible of but one construction, that construction must be given to it. . . . The whble doctrine applicable to the subject may be
summed up in the single observation that resort may be made to prior acts to solve, but not
to create an ambiguity."
9. The statute reads: "No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the
recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed
or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any
sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim
for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary or his delegate, according to the
provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary or his delegate established in pursuance thereof."
10. "No suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal tax
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed
to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive
or in any manner wrongfully collected, until appeal shall have been duly made to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.... "
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the significance of the language as employed in the claim-for-refund statutes
provided "the key to what Congress intended when it used that language in the
jurisdictional provision."' 1
Section 19 of the Revenue Act of July 13, 1866, the original claim-for-refund
statute, provided that "no suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery
of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected,
until appeal shall have been duly made to the commissioner of internal revenue
according to the provisions of law in that regard. . . ." At that time, refund
suits could not be brought against the United States Government directly
because of its sovereign immunity.' 2 A taxpayer was, therefore, required to
initiate a personal action in assumpsit against the collector to whom the tax
3
had been paid, a maneuver still employed.1
11. 357 U.S. at 65.
12. With the passage of the Tucker Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505, the
United States Government became directly suable in the federal district courts. The latter
were granted concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims over all suits "founded upon
the Constitution of the United States or any law of Congress, . . . or upon any contract,
expressed or implied, with the Government of the United States ..... Act of Mar. 3, 1887,
ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505. This broad terminology was construed as including income tax
refund suits. United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co., 237 U.S. 28 (1915). While
the jurisdiction of the district courts was limited to suits not in excess of $1,000, this ceiling
was raised to $10,000 in 1911. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1093. Suits
in excess of $10,000 could be brought in the court of claims in Washington. The jurisdictional
limitation of the district courts was finally eliminated by a 1954 amendment to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1958).
The Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1310(c), 42 Stat. 310-11, contained the language
currently employed in section 1346(a)(1), the tripartite categories of claims enumerated
previously in Rev. Stat. 3226 (1875). Section 1310(c) read: "Paragraph 'Twentieth' of
section 24 of the Judicial Code is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
paragraph: 'Concurrent with the Court of Claims, of any suit or proceeding, commenced
. . . for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without
authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected,
under the internal revenue laws, even if the claim exceeds $10,000, if the collector of
internal revenue by whom such tax, penalty, or sum was collected is dead at the time
such suit or proceeding is commenced.'"
This latter part of the statute was an amendment proposed by Senator Jones of New
Mexico during debate on the Revenue Bill of 1921. It was intended to counteract the
Supreme Court decision of Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co., 257 U.S. 1 (1921), which held
that a collector must be sued personally, thus disallowing any suit against the office or
successor in office of a deceased collector in the district courts. In this situation, if the tax
claim exceeded $10,000, recourse had to be had to the Court of Claims in Washington. The
Jones Amendment alleviated this problem by permitting the taxpayer to bring his suit
in the district court against the United States. See 61 Cong. Rec. 7506-07 (1921) ; H.R. Rep.
No. 486, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1921). This statute is the predecessor of the current
jurisdictional provision found in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1952).
13. The action for money had and received was effectively utilized in the absence of
legislation authorizing suits against the United States for erroneous or unjust taxation. As
the United States Government ultimately paid in cases decided against the collector, its
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The majority in the instant case relied heavily upon the 1875 Supreme Court
decision in Cheatkam v. United States.14 That case was, in fact, a suit brought
against the collector to recover an alleged illegal exaction of tax. 15 The Court
disallowed the action because the assessment had not been contested by an
appeal to the commissioner before instituting suit.1 6 Departing from the facts
before it, the Cheatham Court commented upon the remedies afforded a tax
litigant who wished to contest a tax assessment. This dictum was quoted at
length by the Court in the instant case. The Ckeatzam Court observed that
"while a free course of remonstrance and appeal is allowed within the departments before the money is finally exacted, the general government has wisely
made the payment of the tax claimed, whether of customs or of internal revenue, a condition precedent to a resort to courts by the .party against whom
the tax is assessed."'1 From these extraneous remarks, the present Court
inferred that judicial interpretation of the statutes at the time of the Cieatham
decision required "full payment of an assessed tax as a condition precedent
to the right to sue the collector for a refund."' 8
Yet, at the time Cieatkam was decided, the provisions of section 19 of the
Revenue Act of 1866 had been restated in the Revised Statutes of 1875.' 9
What should have been significant was the triple categories contained in Revised
Statutes section 3226 (1875), the successor to section 19.20 There for the first
time was set the essential language currently contained in the jurisdictional statute. Section 3226 provided that: "No suit shall be maintained for the recovery
of . . . any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until appeal shall have been duly made to the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue. . . ." The Cheatham opinion failed to comment on the
addition of the clause beginning with "any sum" and its apparent significance
in view of the more restrictive terminology of section 19 of the Revenue Act
sovereign immunity did not remain unimpaired. The advantages of a suit against the collector included the right to a jury trial. See Plumb, supra note 4, at 705. A judicial discussion of this common-law action is given in Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning, 123 F.2d 776
(3d Cir. 1941), and Hanchett v. Shaughnessy, 126 F. Supp. 769 (N.D.N.Y. 1954). As the
court of appeals observed in Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning, supra at 778: "The importanL
factor is that retention of the money would be unjust because there was no tax legally due.
The common-law liability of the collector to refund the money thus unjustly retained is
still enforced and the action remains as a personal one against him."
14. 92 U.S. 85 (1875).
15. The taxpayer had appealed from a first assessment which had been turned aside bythe commissioner on October 7, 1867, and a new assessment ordered. This second assessment was paid by installments, final payment being made on October 29, 1868. The suiL
to recover the money so paid was filed on January 15, 1869.

16. Under § 19 of the statute, suit could not he brought later than six months from thedate of the decision rendered on appeal. An appeal from the second assessment beforepayment thereof was deemed by the Court a condition precedent to suit. This the taxpayer failed to do.

17. 92 U.S. at 89, quoted with approval in the Flora opinion, 357 U.S. at 68.
18. 357 U.S. at 68.
19. Rev. Stat. § 3226 (1875). See note 10 supra.
20. Ibid.
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of 1866. This omission was construed in the instant case as indicating that
the provisions of section 3226 effected no change in the principle of "pay first
and litigate later."'2 1 Yet, in the Cheatham case, the immediate issue was the
procedural aspect of the Act of 1866; the lower court was not even concerned
with the refund statute, section 3226. Even if the so-called Cheatham principle of "pay first and litigate later" be conceded, the question still remains
as to whether one has to pay all or part of the deficiency assessment in order
to institute a suit for refund. The present Court concluded that full payment
of taxes is a condition precedent to litigation against the collector
and that
22
such a statutory scheme was recognized by the Cheatham Court.

The present Court alleged that prior to 1940, "there does not appear to be
a single case . . . in which a taxpayer attempted a suit for refund of income

23
taxes without paying the full amount the Government alleged to be due."

However, in Cook v. Tait,24 decided in 1924, the Supreme Court exercised

jurisdiction over a case involving an American resident living in Mexico who
had paid part of an income tax assessment and then sued the collector for a
refund in the federal district court. In Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.,2 5
judgment was affirmed for a taxpayer who had sued for a refund after paying
only part of the income tax assessment. Failure to pay the full tax assessed
before litigation was not raised by the Government. On the lower judicial level,
there may be found several pre-1940 tax cases in which the taxpayer sued for
refunds without 2 first
paying the total amount of the tax said to be due by
6
the Government.

Nevertheless, due to the similarity in language between the jurisdictional
statute and the claim-for-refund statute, which remains to the present, the
Court in the instant case arrived at an interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions of section 1346(a)(1) by reference to the judicial construction given
the claim-for-refund statute. Thus, it contended that "the fact that this language had for many years been considered to require full payment before suing
the collector, and the fact that the avowed purpose of the 1921 amendment
was merely to cure an inadequacy in the suit against the collector, combine
21. The Court, therefore, assumed that the Cheatham Court had considered the new
statutes and would have referred to them if they felt that an alteration had been effected
in the alleged requirement of full payment of the tax assessment. This judicial inference
is rather questionable.
22. 357 U.S. at 68.
23. Id. at 69.
24. 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
25. 271 U.S. 170 (1926).
26. See, e.g., Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938) (estate tax); Baldwin v. Higgins,
100 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1938) (income tax); Heinemann Chem. Co. v. Heiner, 92 F.2d 344
(3d Cir. 1937) (corporate income tax); Tsivoglou v. United States, 31 F.2d 706 (1st Cir.
1929) (income tax); Sampson v. Welch, 23 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Cal. 1938), opinion vacated
on other grounds, 40 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (estate tax); McFadden v. United
States, 20 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1937); cf. Charleston Lumber Co. v. United States, 20
F. Supp. 83 (S.D.W.Va.), appeal dismissed by agreement, 93 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1937)
(corporate income tax); Peerless Paper Box Mfg. Co. v. Routzahn, 22 F.2d 459 (N.D.
Ohio 1927) (income and profits tax).
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as persuasive indications that no change was intended in the full-payment
principle declared in Cheatham v. United States ... .
To further bolster its views, the present Court examined the rationale for
the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals in 1924.28 According to the House
report on the measure, "the taxpayer may, prior to the payment of the additional assessment of income . . . or estate taxes, appeal to the Board of Tax
Appeals and secure an impartial and disinterested determination of the issues
involved." 29 The report goes on to state that "he [the taxpayer] is entitled
to an appeal and to a determination of his liability for the tax prior to its
payment." 30
Today, the Tax Court enables a taxpayer to contest a deficiency notice issued
by the Internal Revenue Service prior to its assessment. 31 It is rather significant that Tax Court proceedings restrain the collection of the tax until the
decision of the court has become final.3 2 An examination of the legislative
history of the Tax Court would seem to indicate that Congress sought to
alleviate the hardship of pre-litigation payment of taxes. 3 3 Until the creation
of the Board of Tax Appeals, there was no method by which a taxpayer could
restrain collection of taxes before an independent redetermination of his tax
liability. While the committee reports could lead to the inference, made in
the instant case, that Congress meant to offset the burden of full payment
before litigation, the legislative intent is not so clear as to preclude the suggestion that a taxpayer paying only a part of the tax assessed could not have
brought a suit for refund in the federal courts.3 4
No doubt, the alternate avenues open for tax litigation has served to foster
some confusion and discord in the lower courts. But with the exception of
the instant case, the courts of appeals that have dealt directly with the question
27. 357 U.S. at 72.
28. Rev. Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 336. The Board is now known as the Tax
Court. It has undergone little substantive change and remains basically unaltered by subsequent re-enactments. Its present existence is provided for in Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 7441.
29. H.R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1924).
30. Id. at 7.
31. 3 Rabkin & Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and Estate Taxation § 72.01 (1956).
32. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6213: "[N]o assessment of a deficiency . . . and no levy
or proceeding in court shall be made, begun, or prosecuted . . . until the decision of the
Tax Court has become final." However, under § 6861, an exception exists where the commissioner deems a jeopardy assessment advisable. The Tax Court can determine if there is
a deficiency or overpayment, or an absence of any liability. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6214.
Moreover, it is authorized to increase the deficiency claimed by the commissioner. Ibid. Its
jurisdiction, however, is confined to the taxes and years for which a petition is filed. Ibid.
33. H.R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924). A similar view is expressed in
the Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, S. Rep. No. 393, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9
(1924).
34. At the time of the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals in 1924, the Supreme Court
had exercised jurisdiction in Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924), where a suit for refund had
been brought against the collector without full payment of the tax assessment.
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of full payment as a condition precedent
to tax litigation have generally denied
35
the existence of such a prerequisite.
The underlying rationale of the instant decision can be found in the Court's
belief that refund suits in the federal courts for partial payments of tax deficiencies would restrain or impede the assessment or collection of other taxes. 36
But the liability of the taxpayer for the balance of the tax due has been
explicitly enunciated in the federal courts. 3 7 Under present law, moreover,
except when the Tax Court is reviewing a tax deficiency determination, "no
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall
be maintained in any court.1 38 In effect, this provision would enable the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to assess or collect remaining taxes still outstanding while a suit was pending for refund of the partial payments already made.
Since the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction over excise taxes, the alternate remedies delineated by the instant Court 39 are not available to this class of taxpayers. Accordingly, to meet the full prepayment prerequisite outlined in the
instant case, it has been held that the requirement of full payment of a deficiency assessment is met "by payment in full of the tax on any independent
taxable item or event even although this payment may constitute but a partial
payment of the entire assessment."4 The divisible nature of the excise tax,
35. In Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning, 123 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1941), the court of appeals
reversed the lower court and allowed a refund suit instituted against the collector where
only partial payment of the deficiency assessment had been effected. This was contrary to
an earlier sentiment expressed by the same court in Suhr v. United States, 18 F.2d 81 (3d
Cir. 1927). There, in dictum, it was asserted that "there is no provision for refund to the
taxpayer of any excess payment of any installment or part of his tax, if the whole tax for
the year has not been paid." Suhr v. United States, supra at 83. In the Sirian case, the
appellate court disallowed the reasoning below that recovery of a portion of a tax would
necessarily prevent the collection of the remainder due while suit was pending. Sirian Lamp
Co. v. Manning, supra at 778-79.
A similar attitude was manifested earlier in Coates v. United States, 111 F.2d 609 (2d Cir.
1940), where suit was started to recover two installments paid on an income tax return.
The court of appeals allowed the suit and denied that the taxpayer had to "pay the remaining installments indicated by the incorrect return on pain of losing his remedy to recover
the overpayment." Coates v. United States, supra at 610. While the suit was pending, the
taxpayer had paid the remaining installments due on his tax return at the demand of the
collector. This fact was not mentioned by the court. But cf. Bendheim v. Commissioner, 214
F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1954), where the court claimed that "the payment of the amount
claimed to be due is the prerequisite to a suit in a federal court for a refund"; and Rogers v.
United States, 155 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), which followed the Bendheim ruling. The
division in the Second Circuit was again evident in Hanchett v. Shaughnessy, 126 F. Supp.
769 (N.D.N.Y. 1954), which adhered to the partial payment view enunciated in the Sirian
case. The Hanchett decision was cited with approval in Bushmiaer v. United States, 230 F.2d
146 (8th Cir. 1956).
36. 357 U.S. at 75. See note 35 supra.
37. See, e.g., Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning, 123 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1941); Coates v. United
States, 111 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1940).
38. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7421.
39. 357 U.S. at 75-76.
40. Jones v. Fox, 162 F. Supp. 449, 468 (D. Md. 1958).
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as distinct from the inseparable and single character of income taxes, renders
such an approach possible. 41
While the present Court denied the existence of hybrid remedies for contesting tax deficiencies, provision is made for such in the current Internal Revenue
Code. Until the passage of Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 7422 (e) ,42
concurrent jurisdiction could be exercised by both the federal district court (or
the Court of Claims) and the Tax Court. This situation would arise where the
taxpayer had filed a suit for refund in the federal court, and while the suit was
pending, a notice of deficiency was subsequently issued by the Internal Revenue
Service and the same was then appealed to the Tax Court. 43 Section 7422(e)
gives the taxpayer an election of remedies, if the notice of deficiency is issued
before the case is heard in federal court.44 If appeal is made to the Tax Court,
the federal court will lose jurisdiction; in the absence of an appeal, the taxpayer
has the same burden of proof as though he had appealed to the Tax Court.
In this manner, the taxpayer will have succeeded in bringing a suit in the
federal courts for a judicial determination of his entire tax liability without
45
having paid the entire additional tax deficiency demanded by the Government.
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case has not fully resolved
the confusion existing in the field of tax refund litigation. While the Court
46
it
recognized that its opinion would result in hardships to some taxpayers,
referred any remedial action to Congress. The Court chose to undertake a
construction of the statutes that enhances and supports the governmental fiscal
policy. Nonetheless, the Court arrived at its conclusions by way of an unwar41. Ibid. This point was discussed at length in Friebele v. United States, 20 F. Supp.
492, 493 (D.N.J. 1937), where the court commented that "income taxes and estate taxes flow
from calculations involving complicated considerations of credits, exemptions ....
The resulting tax has been influenced by and reflects these considerations. They are not normally
separable as in the case of the stamp tax. It is a wise law that governs their prepayment
before suit can be brought. Otherwise, the power of collection of taxes would be continuously impeded and rendered practically useless. But in the case of these separable items
the issue is clear-cut. There can be no complicated questions of credits, exemptions, and
the like. It is simply an issue of whether or not the stamp should be applied and in what
amount." This emphasis on the inseparable character of an income tax assessment would
seem to support the contention of the instant opinion that full payment of income taxes
is a prerequisite to litigation. But there is nothing to prevent governmental collection of
the balance of taxes due, in the absence of an appeal to the Tax Court.
42. See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 610-11 (1954).
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Yet this explicit choice granted by Congress is subject to defeat by the administrative
act of asserting a deficiency prior to the commissioner's rejection of the refund claim, since
the latter is a prerequisite to any suit in the courts. This aspect of the problem was
pointed out by the court in Jones v. Fox, 162 F. Supp. 449, 468 (D. Md. 1958).
46. Since claims for refunds must be filed within three years after the due date for the
filing Qf the return, or within two years after the payment of the tax, whichever comes
later, a taxpayer paying his taxes in installments may lose his right of appeal if the entire
tax is not paid until after the relevant statute of limitations for such claims has elapsed.
See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6511, 6532; 3 Rabkin & Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and
Estate Taxation, §§ 72.04, 76.03 (1956). See criticism of Dean Erwin Griswold of Harvard
Law School as reported in N.Y. Times, October 27, 1958, p. 27, col. 1.
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ranted dependence upon the Cheatham dictum. Its examination of the legislative history of the relevant statutes was apparently colored by what it
asserted was the commonly accepted statutory scheme of full payment before
litigation as expressed in the Cheatham case.7 Starting out from its selfpronounced assumption of full payment, the Court endeavored to bolster its
position by drawing inferences from congressional documents that could have
also been employed to support the opposite viewpoint. A proper solution would
seem to require legislative reformation to clarify congressional intent, rather
than judicial legislation.
Labor Relations - Effect of Hot Cargo Clauses in Collective Bargaining
Agreements.-In three separate cases, the National Labor Relations Board
issued cease and desist orders against three unions for violation' of section
8(b)(4)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act, notwithstanding the existence of hot
cargo clauses2 in the collective bargaining agreements between the respective
unions and their employers. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit enforced the Board's order against one of the unions. The court of
appeals for the District of Columbia enforced it against another because it was
not a party to the collective bargaining agreement and could not rely on the hot
cargo clause as a defense, but it set aside the order against the third, accepting
the hot cargo clause as a defense to charges filed under section 8(b) (4) (A) of
the act. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of con47. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. Following the decision in Sirian Lamp Co.
v. Manning, 123 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1941), there were again several tax refund suits in which
full payment of the tax claimed by the government as due was not made prior to litigation.
The jurisdictional issue over nonpayment was not raised by the Government in these cases.
See, e.g., Kavanagh v. First Nat'l Bank, 139 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1943) (corporation and
excess profits tax) ; Snyder v. Westover, 107 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. Cal. 1952), rev'd on other
grounds, 217 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1954) (income tax); Jack Little Foundation v. Jones, 102
F. Supp. 326 (W.D. Okla. 1951) (corporate income tax); Terrell v. United States, 64 F.
Supp. 418 (E.D. La. 1946) (estate taxes). Subsequent to Hanchett v. Shaughnessy, 126 F.
Supp. 769 (N.D.N.Y. 1954), the Government again failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956) (income tax); Gallagher v. Smith,
223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955) (income tax); Lewis v. Scofield, 57-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. II 9251
(W.D. Tex. 1956), aff'd, 251 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1958) (income tax); Wheeler v. Holland,
120 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ga. 1954), aff'd per curiam, 218 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1955) (income
tax); Dickstein v. McDonald, 149 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 255
F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1958) (income tax); Freeman v. United States, 58-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. ff 9309 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (income tax); Peters v. Smith, 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas. II 9543 (E.D.
Pa. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 221 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1955) (income tax).
1. The complaint was that the unions induced and encouraged employees not to handle
certain non-union material over the objection of employers. 357 U.S. 93, 95 (1958).
2. A hot cargo clause is an agreement by an employer as part of a collective bargaining
contract with the union to permit his employees to refuse to handle the goods of an
"unfair employer," that is, an employer involved in a labor dispute. McAllister Transfer,
Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769, 1777 (1954).
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flicts among the circuits as to the meaning of the section and affirmed as to the
first two, but reversed as to the third union. A provision in a labor agreement
by which an employer agrees that his employees shall not be required to handle
non-union material is not a defense to union actions which would otherwise be
violative of section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act.
Local 1976 United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
At common law a neutral employer not involved in a labor dispute could
enjoin work stoppages designed to pressure him into boycotting the products
of another employer who was engaged in a labor controversy. 3 Such work
stoppages were immunized from injunction by the provisions of the Norris
LaGuardia Act of 1932, 4 but Congress nullified this immunity with the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft Hartley Act) 5
which made it an unfair labor practice for a union to encourage or induce
employees to engage in a "strike or a concerted refusal" to work for the purpose
of forcing an employer to cease doing business with another party.
Since the language of section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act contains a prohibition against specific types of coerced secondary
boycotts, it has been generally accepted that voluntary secondary boycotts do
not come within the condemnation of the act. However, the courts, the NLRB,
and the individual members of the Board have been at odds in construing the
act with respect to a6 case in which the collective bargaining agreement contains
a hot cargo clause.
7
When first presented with the problem, the NLRB in Conway's Express
enunciated what might be called the "consent in advance" theory. Reasoning
that the act nowhere expressly forbids an employer's voluntary agreement to
boycott non-union material, the Board concluded that there was no violation
of the act when the employer in effect consented to the boycott in advance
by agreeing to the hot cargo clause. 8 "Consent in advance to honor a hot cargo
3.
4.

Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction 43 (1930).
47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1952).

5. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952). Section 158(b) (4) (A) provides:
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . .
"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage
in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring
any employer.., or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor or manufacturer, or to cease
doing business with any other person... 21
6. For an excellent discussion of the problems posed by the hot cargo clause see
Comment, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 522 (1957).
7. 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), enforcement granted sub nom., Rabouin v. NLRB, 195
F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
8. 87 N.L.R.B. at 982. The Conway Doctrine was followed in Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953). There the Board introduced the further point that in
order to have a violation of the act the employees' refusal must have been within their
"course of employment." Handling unfair goods was not in the course of employment
since it was excluded under the hot cargo clause in the bargaining agreement.
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clause is not the product of the union's 'forcing or requiring any employer . . .
to cease doing business with any other person.' "9 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia' as well as the court of appeals for the Second
Circuit" followed this line of reasoning.
A second approach to the question was illustrated by the majority of the
Board in the Sand Door & Plywood Co. case.' 2 Here, the decision to honor
the hot cargo clause was held to be within the exclusive discretion of the
employer exercised at the time the specific dispute arose. Under this view,
any union attempt to influence the neutral employer's decision by appealing
to his employees to assert their rights under the contract would be violative
of the act. This position was adopted by the courts of appeal for the Sixth
and Ninth Circuits.' 3
In McAllister Transfer, Inc.,' 4 the two members of the Board viewed hot
cargo clauses as contrary to public policy and therefore void. By interpreting
the act as prohibiting all secondary boycotts, the Board could not but conclude
that the secondary employer is incapable as a matter of law to acquiesce in
advance to the enforcement of a hot cargo clause.' 5
In the instant case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, following the rationale underlying the second approach, found the hot cargo clause to be legal but unenforceable. He reasoned that the act did not ban all secondary boycotts but only
those brought about as a result of union inducement or coercion. It follows
that any union inducement of employees which would violate the act in the
absence of a hot cargo clause is likewise prohibited when such a clause is
incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement. In brief, the hot cargo
clause was considered to be legally irrelevant on the issue of an alleged violation of section 8(b) (4) (A).
In the Court's view, the Taft Hartley Act reserved to the employer the
9. Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1952).
10. General Drivers Union v. NLRB, 247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
11. Milk Drivers Union v. NLRB, 116 N.L.R.B. 1408 (1956), rev'd, 245 F.2d 817 (2d
Cir. 1957); Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
12. 13 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955), aff'd sub nom. NLRB v. Local 1976, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1957). This is one of the cases on appeal in the
instant case.
13. NLRB v. Local 11, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 242 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1957);
NLRB v. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1957).
In the American Iron and Machine case, 115 N.L.R.B. 800 (1956), the Board extended
the Sand Door doctrine so that any inducement or appeal to employees to refuse to handle
hot goods is a violation of the Labor Management Relations Act, whether or not the
employer acquiesces in the union's demands.

14. 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954). The Board reasoned that secondary employees should
not be allowed to accomplish by agreements that which is clearly inimical to the public
interest by congressional enactment. This view was first introduced by Member Reynolds
in his partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion in Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B.
972 (1949).
15. See Member Rodgers' concurring opinions in the Sand Door & Plywood Co. case, 113
N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955) and the American Iron case, 115 N.L.R.B. 800 (1956). See also
Comment, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 522 (1957).
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right to choose whether to acquiesce in the boycott when the concrete situation
arose, and such a choice must, as a matter of federal policy, be available to
the neutral employer regardless of any previous agreement on his part. The
Court also noted the possibility that an employer might have been forced to
agree to a hot cargo clause by coercion in the form of threatened strikes at
the time of the bargaining, and concluded that, "to allow the union to invoke
a provision to justify conduct that in the absence of such a provision would
be a violation of the statute might give it the means to transmit to the moment
of boycott, through the contract, the very pressures from which Congress has
determined to relieve secondary employers." 16 However, it is hardly valid to
argue that the act condemned coercion in the abstract, that the collective bargaining agreement may have resulted from coercion and, therefore, consent
given cannot be carried forward to the time of the actual boycott. There is
no reason why a collective bargaining agreement, like any other contract,
should not be accorded prima facie validity.
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, stated that enforcement of a collective
bargaining agreement is not one of the coercive practices at which the statute
is aimed. In his view, the statute outlaws all coerced secondary boycotts, and
whereas the reason an employer agrees to a hot cargo clause can only be surmised, it is certain that where he voluntarily agrees to it, he is not coerced
in the statutory sense.17 The dissent considered the present decision capricious
in that it makes the legality or illegality of a boycott depend upon whether
or not the employer decides to live up to his collective bargaining agreement.
In view of the purpose of the Taft Hartley Act, "to promote the full flow
of commerce . . . and to protect the rights of the public in connection with
labor disputes affecting commerce,"' it is reasonable to conclude, as the Court
did, that section 8(b) (4) (A) of the act was intended to assure the secondary
employer, as a matter of federal policy, the right freely to choose whether to
engage in a secondary boycott at the time the concrete situation arises. Such
an interpretation would preclude an enforceable consent in advance such as
is proposed by Mr. Justice Douglas in the instant case. But does not such
an interpretation also, by necessary implication, import that Congress likewise
intended to declare hot cargo clauses themselves within the condemnation
of the act?
The Court's position is a middle ground between outright condemnation of
the hot cargo clause and Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent which is in effect an
outright acceptance of the clause as a defense to charges brought under section
8(b) (4) (A) of the act. As a result of the Supreme Court's holding in the
principal case, we are left with the somewhat anomalous situation wherein the
clause is legal of itself but incapable of enforcement. 19 Since the Court considered the hot cargo clause a legal but unenforceable agreement aimed at
accomplishing a result the statute was enacted to prevent, it might logically
16. 357 U. S. at 106.
17. 357 U.S. at 113, 114 (dissenting opinion).
18. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1952).
19. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), where a racially restrictive covenant
was unenforceable although not held to be illegal.
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have escaped this anomaly by declaring such provisions illegal per se. Such
a result would be justified were the contractual consent in advance considered
an inducement which the act prohibits. So to conclude would vitiate any
contractual consent made in advance, but, unlike the position of the Board
in McAllister Transfer, Inc.,2° it would still recognize that a neutral employer
can voluntarily engage in a secondary boycott.
Labor Relations - State 'Courts' Jurisdiction Where Tortious Conduct
Constitutes an Unfair Labor Practice.-A picket line, by threats of violence,
prevented the plaintiff from entering his employer's plant. He brought suit
in a state court against the union for malicious interference with the employee's
lawful occupation. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, which the United States Supreme Court, with two Justices
dissenting, also affirmed. A common-law right of action for damages resulting
from conduct which constitutes an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b)
(1) (A) of the Labor Management Relations Act, is not destroyed, regardless of the possibility of obtaining partial relief under the federal act. United
Auto Workers, CIO v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
When Congress, acting in an area of dominant federal concern and as part
of a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation, confers rights and creates
remedies with respect to certain conduct, state action conflicting with 2 or supplementing it 3 is invalid. It is often important, however, to determine whether
Congress intended to pre-empt the field to share concurrenf jurisdiction with
the states4 since, "the areas that have been pre-empted by federal authority
and thereby withdrawn from state power are not susceptible of delimitation
by fixed metes and bounds. Obvious conflict, actual or potential, leads to easy
judicial exclusion of state action." 5 The Supreme Court has said that the
Labor Management Relations Act "leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much." 6
The statute granting the NLRB the authority to prevent any unfair labor
practice affecting interstate commerce 7 provides a comprehensive federal procedure for aggrieved parties to follow in such cases. Recognized exceptions
exist in cases involving conduct which is neither prohibited nor protected
20.

See note 14 supra and accompanying text.

1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (1952). It is "an unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . . to restrain or
coerce . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 157 . . ." of the
federal act.
2. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
3. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
4. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 157 (1942).
5. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
6. Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
7. Section 10(a), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1952). See U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3.
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by the Labor Management Relations Act, and is therefore "governable by
the State or... entirely ungoverned, ' 8 and also in cases concerning the state's
"historic powers over such traditionally local matters as public safety and
order and the use of streets and highways." 9 It is important to note that where
Congress has entrusted the NLRB with jurisdiction and the Board refuses to
assume it for one reason or another, 10 a state may not automatically receive
such jurisdiction.".
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.'2 decided in 1954 held
that even where the activities of the union constitute an unfair labor practice,
the federal act does not deprive the employee of his common-law tort action.
Stressing the primary purposes of the act' 3 and the fact that it does not provide extensive compensatory procedures, 14 the Court in the instant case concluded that Congress did not intend it to constitute an exclusive pattern of
money damage for private injuries.15 The majority reasoned that if Congress
intended to confer such exclusive jurisdiction on the Board, it would have
endeavored to provide an adequate substitute for state court procedures for
collecting damages.
The majority refused to consider Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL 0 con8. United Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 254
(1949).
9. Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942); accord, United Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
10. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
The National Labor Relations Board declined jurisdiction because it believed that intervention would not be in furtherance of the purposes of the act. Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). Budgetary reasons were principally responsible for
the NLRB's refusal to accept jurisdiction.
11. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1952). The ceding by the NLRB of
its jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice affecting commerce to a state agency is the
exclusive means whereby states may be enabled to act concerning matters which Congress
has entrusted to the NLRB. The NLRB can cede jurisdiction only when the employer's
operations are predominantly local in character and if the applicable provisions of the state
or territorial statute and the rules of decision thereunder are consistent with the corresponding provision of the national act, as interpreted by the board and the courts.
12. 347 U.S. 656 (1954). In the Laburnum case a union demanded recognition in ,such
a violent manner that the employer was forced to abandon a construction project, thereby
suffering a monetary loss. A subsequent award of damages to the employer in a Virginia
court was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
13. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1952).
14. 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952). The NLRB may take "affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies of this Act: Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee,
back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, ...responsible for the
discrimination suffered by him ......

15. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). See also Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
16. 346 U.S. 485 (1953). In the Garner case a firm obtained an injunction from a state
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trolling. The Court, quoting the Laburnum case, declared: "To the extent
that Congress prescribed preventive procedure against unfair labor practices,
that case [the Garner case] recognized that the Act excluded conflicting state
procedure to the same end. To the extent, however, that Congress has not
prescribed procedure for dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct
already committed, there is no ground for concluding that existing criminal
penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated."' 7 In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,1s a related case decided on the
same day as the instant case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that
certain wrongful acts, while unfair labor practices, are not pre-empted by the
federal act and are, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the state courts.
The dissenting Justices in the instant case argued that the state court lacked
jurisdiction, even if the NLRB had no authority to award back pay, and that
the existence of such a gap in the remedial scheme of federal regulation is
not to be taken as a license for the state to fashion corrective measures.' 9
Assuming the Board had authority to compensate for the loss of wages, the
dissent reasoned that state action would then be a duplication of remedies
and an invalid interference with rights protected by the federal act,20 and that
the states cannot curtail federal power even though the reasons for state
intervention be different from that on which federal supremacy has been
exercised.

21

In the minority view, the Laburnum case was distinguishable because it
involved a suit by an employer against a stranger union for damages caused
by interference with the contractual relationship between the employer and a
third party while the instant case involved a union recognized as the employee's
bargaining agent and with which the employer would have continued relations.
In addition, it was noted that here the plaintiff had federal procedures at his
disposal, while in the Laburnum case no corrective machinery was available.
Therefore, there was no compensatory or administrative federal relief with
which the state remedy conflicted.22 Finally the dissenting Justices felt that
court enjoining a union from attempting by peaceful picketing to coerce the employees
into joining their union. The state supreme court reversed the order and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed, declaring: "Congress evidently considered that centralized administration . . . was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and
to avoid . . . conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes
toward labor controversies."
17. 347 U.S. at 665.
18. 356 U.S. 617 (1958). The Court reasoned that since "in the Laburnum case, certain
state causes of action sounding in tort are not displaced simply because there may be an
argumentative coincidence in facts adducible in the tort action and a plausible procedure
before the National Labor Relations Board, a state remedy for breach of contract also
ought not be displaced by such evidentiary coincidence, when the possibility of conflict
with federal policy is similarly remote." Id. at 621.
19. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
20. See note 16 supra.
21. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
22. The minority believes the rule of the Laburnum case is simply that "a tortfeasor
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approval of a state court damage award "assures that the consequence of engaging in an unfair labor practice will vary from state to state. '23 Some courts
allow punitive damages. Some do not. Obviously, complaining parties will not
seek a cease and desist order and an award of back pay, which the NLRB
could grant, if it is possible to secure from a state court compensatory damages
plus substantial punitive damages.
The Laburnum case opened the door, however slightly, to state regulation.
The ruling was necessary since, "Congress has neither provided nor suggested
any substitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting damages
for injuries caused by tortious conduct." 24 The remedy in the Laburnum
case, did not conflict in any way with the remedy provided by the federal
act. No such reason exists for justifying the holding in the instant case, since
here the actual damages suffered were lost wages. Thus, two separate remedies
are brought to bear on the same activity.23
The NLRB has authority to take affirmative action by awarding back pay
if the award will help effectuate the purposes of the federal act 6 The states
can award even punitive damages regardless of its effect on existing labor relations in that state and elsewhere. This,. coupled with the length of time necessary to settle a state court case will frustrate the promotion of labor peace
and the solution of labor disputes.
The Supreme Court has here placed an important phase of labor regulation in the hands of individual states. The differing attitudes which the various states have toward labor controversies is certain to beget a diversity of
decision and a lack of uniformity in labor regulation. Congress created all
the relief it thought necessary to accomplish its purpose when it provided for
a recovery of lost wages by the injured party. The additional redress under
state law will exercise an unwarranted restraint upon labor organizations. The
authority thus given to the states is a strategic weapon to hammer out local
policy in what was regarded as an area pre-empted by federal law.
Labor Relations - Union's Liability for Wrongful Expulsion.-Plaintiffs
were expelled from defendant union after a trial c6mmittee's determination
adjudging them guilty of dual unionism was adopted at a regular meeting
of the membership and upheld by the local Executive Board. A further appeal to the National Executive Committee was still pending when plaintiffs
instituted this action for reinstatement and reimbursement for wages lost.'
The appellate division reversed special term's decision dismissing the comshould not be allowed to immunize himself from liability for a wrong having no relation
to federal law simply because the means he adopts to effect the wrong transgress a comprehensive code of federal regulation." 356 U.S. at 655.
23. 3 6 U.S. at 651 (dissenting opinion).

24. 347 U.S. at 663-64.
25. 346 U.S. at 498.
26. See note 14 supra.
1. The national union, its affiliated local and the latter's two principal officers were
the defendants named in the complaint.
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plaint and ordered the union to reinstate the plaintiffs but refused to award
damages. The court of appeals modified the appellate court holding and
affirmed as modified. Establishing an intra-union group to work for better
trade unionism does not constitute dual unionism and is not a proper ground
for expulsion and, where wrongful expulsion is accomplished in accordance with
the union's constitution, the union is liable in damages for the loss of wages
sustained. Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1958).
Courts generally are reluctant to interfere in disputes involving private
organizations and their members on the theory, "that the members are, in a
sense, one family, and entitled to settle their family jars without outside interference, and in their own way."'2 An appeal, therefore, for judicial settlement
of such a dispute will usually be entertained only after the plaintiff has completely exhausted the remedies available to him within the organization. 3
Courts, however, have disregarded the so-called "exhaustion of remedies" rule
and assumed jurisdiction where necessary to insure impartiality, 4 or the availability of adequate relief, 5 and also where an unusual delay is involved in
procuring a hearing.6 It was on this latter basis that the court in the instant
case assumed jurisdiction. One wrongfully expelled from a union need not
futilely continue to seek relief beyond a reasonable time, and should the appellate body fail to hear an appeal within a reasonable time, the plaintiff can be
said to have no further adequate remedy within the union and he is entitled
to make application to the courts.'
Once a court decides to assume jurisdiction in such a dispute, its function
is to test the actions of the parties involved against certain objective criteria.
The union constitution, considered as a contract of membership, is one such
criterion. Where one is expelled for acts not made expellable offenses by the
constitution or by-laws, his contract has been violated and the court will order
reinstatement.8 Another criterion would be to determine whether the union
proceeding adhered to the elementary requirements of due process. 9
2. Bricklayers' Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. Supp. 855, 858-59 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd mem.,
198 App. Div. 967, 189 N.Y. Supp. 938 (4th Dep't 1921).
3. In Havens v. King, 221 App. Div. 475, 480, 224 N.Y. Supp. 193, 199 (3d Dep't 1927),
aff'd mem. sub nom., Havens v. Dodge, 250 N.Y. 617, 166 N.E. 346 (1929), where the
expelled plaintiff had used only two of the three appeals open to him, the court dismissed
the complaint, stating, "it was his duty to exhaust his remedy by appeal within the order."
4. Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1st Dep't 1931).
5. Brown v. Order of Foresters, 176 N.Y. 132, 68 N.E. 145 (1903).
6. Ibid. But cf. Keller v. Lindelof, 268 App. Div. 877, 50 N.Y.S.2d 705 (2d Dep't
1944), aff'd mem., 294 N.Y. 717, 61 N.E.2d 452 (1945), where it was held that plaintiff
had to exhaust his remedies even though he would be unable to conduct his next appeal
for more than two years.
7. The plaintiffs in the instant case had waited four to six months to obtain a hearing
before resorting to the courts.
8. Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 281, 177 N.E. 833, 834 (1931), declared: "The Constitution and by-laws of an unincorporated association express the terms of a contract which
define the privileges secured and the duties assumed by those who have become members."
9. In Glauber v. Patof, 183 Misc. 400, 47 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 269
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The principal case involved an expulsion for a cause set forth in the constitution, and due process was observed. In such a case, as the concurring
opinion pointed out, the only question posed is whether there is sufficient
evidence for an honest mind to reach the conclusion of the union, or whether
the record is so bare of evidence to sustain the decision as to show the union's
decision to be purely arbitrary. This, of course, is largely a factual determination and it was on this factual basis that the appellate division reversed in the
case at bar.
The contrary conclusions reached by special term and the appellate courts
in the principal case evidence completely divergent philosophies of trade unionism. Whereas the trial court stressed the divisive effects of criticism within
the union, and concluded that the union membership should be allowed to
decide what is or is not for the good of the union, the court of appeals took a
broader view, and wisely upheld "the right to criticize current union leadership and, within the union, to oppose such leadership and its policies"' 0
on the ground that "a labor union profits, as does any democratic body, more
by permitting free expression and free political opposition than it may ever
lose from any disunity that it may thus evidence."" The trial court's decision would in effect give unchecked powers to the union and would deprive
the membership of protection against the oppressive measures of intolerant
majorities or high-handed union officers. To curtail the right of fair criticism could never be for the good of the union no matter what the majority
of its members may have decided, and any provisions in the union constitu12
tion suppressing this right would be declared void and unenforceable.
Having determined that the plaintiffs be reinstated for wrongful expulsion,
the court awarded damages against the union. To sue a union at common
law, all of its individual members had to be named and joined.' 3 By statute
in Nevi York, 14 however, the plaintiff has been relieved of the necessity of
naming all the members, but not of showing the liability of all.
Some cases have interpreted the requirement that all members be liable
quite literally. In a relatively early case,15 the court of appeals *reversed a
lower court which had awarded damages for wrongful expulsion, holding that
App. Div. 687, 54 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1st Dep't 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 294 N.Y. 583,
63 N.E.2d 181 (1945), the court observed that the proceedings need not take on the
formalities of a court proceeding, but must satisfy the elementary requirements of any
judicial proceeding, viz., notice of charges, a hearing, and a fair trial with impartial judges.
10. 4 N.Y.2d at 293, 151 N.E.2d at 78, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
11. Ibid.
12. Schrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 83, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452, 455 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
13. The federal rule is an exception. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,
259 U.S. 344 (1932).

14. N.Y. Gen. Ass'ns Law § 13: "An action or special proceeding may be maintained,
against the president or treasurer of such an association . . .upon any cause of action,
for or upon which the plaintiff may maintain such an action or special proceeding, against
all the associates, by reason of .. .their liability therefor, either jointly or severally."
15. People ex rel. Solomon v. Brotherhood of Painters, 218 N.Y. 115, 112 N.E. 752
(1916).
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facts must be alleged and proven which render all the members of the association liable for the sum claimed. As Browne v. Hibbets16 stated, "plaintiff's
right to recover damages depends upon .proof of facts rendering all the members of the association liable for the sum claimed .... In the absence of allega-

tions and proof of fraud or bad faith on the part of the membership as a
whole, no recovery of damages may be obtained.' 7 The court of appeals
in the instant case declined to follow Browne v. Hibbets and similar cases,
finding them distinguishable on a factual basis which they did not mention.
An examination of the cases that were relied on, however, discloses that not
one of them took up the issue of whether damages could be awarded against
an unincorporated association.
The court in the instant case did discuss the issue and laid down the rule
that "where it [wrongful expulsion] is brought about by action on the part
of the membership, at a meeting or otherwise, in accordance with the union
constitution, the act of expulsion will be regarded as the act of the union for
which damages may be recovered from the union funds."' 8 The problem of
the liability of all the members is clearly disposed of by the court's statement
that, "the requisite participation of the membership was sufficiently shown to
justify liability against the organization, even though not against individual
members."' 19 Thus, it will no longer be necessary to show actual personal
liability of all or any percentage of the membership, for, under the union constitution, considered as a contract of membership, all the members are liable
jointly but not necessarily severally 2° for the wrongs committed by those
to whom they have delegated authority when that authority is exercised in
accordance with the constitution. The decision, then, is a recognition both
of the necessity for allowing honest dissension within a union and of the
need for judicial curbs on the power of a union over its membership, especially
where wrongful deprivation of union membership may be a serious interference
with a member's ability to earn a living.
Although the court of appeals maintained that it was merely following established law, its precedents were vague and of dubious authority, so that
the instant case must be taken as the first clear statement of the law of New
York on the point of damages. The rationale behind the awarding of damages in such cases is given for the first time, namely, that it is not too much
to require the union to assume responsibility for the wrongful expulsion of a
member by a number less than all where the membership has expressly provided for
such a delegation of disciplinary power. By sanctioning the delegation of authority,
16.

290 N.Y. 459, 49 N.E.2d 713 (1945).

Id. at 467, 49 N.E.2d at 717.
4 N.Y.2d at 296, 151 N.E.2d at 79, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
19. Ibid.
20. The concurring opinion saw no reason why the defendant, being sued individually as
well as in his capacity as an officer, was not held individually liable for damages. It does
17.

18.

appear that the association and the individual can both be liable. April v. Baird, 32 App.
Div. 226, 52 N.Y. Supp. 973 (2d Dep't 1898); Lubliner v. Reinlib, 184 Misc. 472, 50
N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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the membership subjects the funds of the union to liability for the abuse of such
power by those entrusted with it . . . a contrary result would have far-reaching
for damage suffered, little
consequences. If one wrongfully expelled has no redress
21
more is needed to stifle all criticism within the union.

Negligence - Intervening Insanity of Third Person Unforeseeable by Defendant.---One Richard Springstead sustained injuries as the result of the
negligent operation of an automobile driven by the defendant. Seven years
later Springstead shot and injured the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that as a
result of the initial automobile accident, Springstead at the time of the shooting was unable to realize the nature and consequences of his act, was not able
to resist pulling the trigger of the rifle, and was deprived of his capacity to
govern his conduct in accordance with reason. The New York Supreme Court,
Special Term, granted the defendant's motion for a judgment on the pleadings.
The court held as a matter of law that the defendant's negligence was not of
.such a nature as to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Firman
-v. Sacia, 11 Misc. 2d 243, 173 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
The question of proximate cause arises when it has been decided that the
-defendant's act was in fact one of the causes of the plaintiff's injuries.1 There
are many widely varying concepts as to what should be the proper formula for
determining proximate cause 2 The New York courts have variously employed
the "but for" test,3 the "substantial factor" test,4 the "direct results" test,5
the "natural and probable consequences" or "foreseeability" testI and have at
times used some of these tests jointly.7 In the instant case the court relied
21. 4 N.Y.2d at 296, 151 N.E.2d at 80, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
1. See Prosser, Torts § 47 (2d ed. 1955).
2. See generally, 2 Harper & James, Torts §§ 20.4-20.6 (1956); Prosser, op. cit. supra
note 1, §§ 47-50; James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 Yale L.J. 761 (1951).
3. The "but for" test is generally used in those cases where there are concurring causes
contributing to the injury. See, e.g., Thompson v. Town of Bath, 142 App. Div. 331, 126
N.Y. Supp. 1074 (4th Dep't 1911), aff'd, 205 N.Y. 573, 98 N.E. 1117 (1912).
4. "The negligent act must be regarded as one of the actual causes of the injury if it
was a substantial factor in bringing the injury about (Restatement, Torts § 431)." Rugg
v. State, 284 App. Div. 179, 182, 131 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (3d Dep't 1954).
5. The court said in McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 223; 94 N.E.
616, 617 (1911): "[A] negligent person is responsible for the direct effects of his acts ......
"'Direct' consequences are those which follow in sequence from the effect of the defendant's act upon conditions existing and forces already in operation at the time, without
the intervention of any external forces which come into active operation later." Prosser,
op. cit. supra note 1, § 48.
6. See, e.g., Saugerties Bank v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 236 N.Y. 425, 430, 141 N.E.
904, 905 (1923), where the court said that if the consequences were only made possible
by the intervening act of a third person which could not have reasonably been anticipated,
the act of the defendant would not be the proximate cause of the consequences. This
test is used primarily in those cases where an independent intervening force comes into
play after the defendant's negligence.
7. In Hartman v. Berlin & Jones Envelope Co., 71 Misc. 30, 127 N.Y. Supp. 187 (Sup.
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upon the foreseeability doctrine to grant the defendant's motion, ruling that
(can act or omission does not constitute actionable negligence, unless a reasonhave foreseen
ably prudent person, placed in the position of the actor, would
'8
the probability of harm resulting from his acts or omissions."
Proximate cause will always depend upon the particular facts of each case, 9
and the court must be expected to base its decision upon those prior cases involving those facts which most closely resemble the factual situation before
it.' 0 Was the foreseeability criterion properly suited to the instant facts?
In a substantially similar decision, Lynch v. Fisher," the Court of Appeals
of Louisiana was confronted with a situation wherein the plaintiff, while aiding the parties to an accident, was shot minutes after the accident by one of
the injured parties who had become delirious as a result of the accident
caused by the negligence of the defendants. The court held that the doctrine
act set in motion
of foreseeability did not protect a defendant whose negligent
12
a chain of circumstances leading to the resultant injury.
There is an analogous line of cases in which a party, by reason of his insanity' 3 or derangement' 4 caused by the defendant's negligence, commits suicide.' 5 The landmark in this type of case is Daniels v. New York, N.H. &
Ct.), aff'd mem., 146 App. Div. 926, 131 N.Y. Supp. 1119 (2d Dep't 1911), where plaintiff,
while trying to lift a barrel was struck by the barrel and thrown onto an unguarded revolving belt, the court required that both the "but for" and the "foreseeability" tests be
complied with in order to establish proximate cause. See also Babcock v. Fitzpatrick, 221
App. Div. 638, 642, 225 N.Y. Supp. 30, 33 (3d Dep't 1927), aff'd, 248 N.Y. 608, 162 N.E.
543 (1928), where the court required that the consequence so "directly result" from the
negligent act that it might reasonably be expected.
8. 11 Misc. 2d 243, 245, 173 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442.
9. See O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423, 433, 171 N.E. 694, 697 (1930);
38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 53 (1941); 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability 110 (1906).
10. See Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 692 (1953).
11. 34 So. 2d 513 (La. Ct. of App. 1947). The court made no reference to this
decision, notwithstanding that it was considered in the plaintiff's brief. See Answering
Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 6, 7.
12. 34 So. 2d at 518. It might reasonably be argued that this case is distinguishable
from the case at hand in that the plaintiff was a rescuer. A negligent act which invites
rescue is the proximate cause of injuries sustained by one attempting to rescue those
imperiled by the said negligent act. Id. at 517. See also Annot., 19 A.L.R. 13 (1922).
13. "Insanity. . . . In law, such a want of reason, memory, and intelligence as prevents a man from comprehending the nature and consequences of his acts or from distinguishing between right and wrong conduct." Black, Law Dictionary 929 (4th ed. 1951).
"Legal insanity . . .is a mental deficiency with reference to the particular act in question
and not a general incapacity." Bouvier, Law Dictionary 555 (Baldwin's Century ed. 1926).
14. "This term includes all forms of mental unsoundness, except of the natural born
idiot." Black, Law Dictionary 930 (4th ed. 1930).
15. There is also a similar line of decisions where liability for injuries sustained by one
who is in a dazed or stunned condition as a result of previous injury is placed on the
person responsible for such previous injury. See Wisotsky v. Frankel, 165 N.Y. Supp. 243
(Sup. Ct., App. T. 1917); Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 690 (1953).
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H.R.R., 0 which set forth the requirement "that the liability of a defendant
for a death by suicide exists only when the death is the result of an uncontrollable impulse, or is accomplished in delirium or frenzy caused. by the collision, and without conscious volition to produce death, having knowledge of
the physical nature and consequences of the act."'1 7 An act performed in such
a mental condition is an involuntary act, and as such does not disturb the
line of causation from accident to death.' 8 If the act is voluntary, it is considered as an independent intervening cause which breaks the chain of causation.' 9 The criterion for determining the defendant's liability for the subse16. 183 Mass. 393, 399-400; 67 N.E. 424, 426 (1903) (dictum). The court in this
case did not hold the defendant liable because the act of suicide was voluntary and wilful.
Thus, the act was such a new and independent agency as to dissever the line of causation
from accident to death. Id. at 399, 67 N.E. at 426. The rule enunciated by the Daniels
case is at variance with the rule set down in Scheffer v. Railroad, 105 U.S. 249, 252 (1881),
where in a similar fact situation the Court held without reservation that suicide was
not a natural and probable consequence reasonably to be foreseen, that both the insanity
and the suicide were unexpected causes intervening between the initial negligence and subsequent death. The Daniels rule has been referred to as the law in several decisions.
Brown v. American Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N.E. 80 (1909) (dictum); Long
v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 108 Neb. 342, 187 N.W. 930 (1922) (dictum); Arsnow v. Red
Top Cab Co., 159 Wash. 137, 292 Pac. 436 (1930) (dictum). It has been applied as the
basis of decision in at least one jurisdiction. Elliot v. Stone Baking Co., 49 Ga. App. 515,
176 S.E. 112 (1934).
17. The rule is set out in Restatement, Torts § 455 (1934):
If the actor's negligent conduct so brings about the delirium or insanity of another as
to make the actor liable for it, the actor is also liable for harm done by the other to him:
self while delirious or insane, if his delirium or insanity
(a) prevents him from realizing the nature of his act and the certainty or risk of
harm involved therein, or
(b) makes it impossible for him to resist an impulse caused by his insanity which
deprives him of his capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with reason.
18. See Elliot v. Stone Baking Co., 49 Ga. App. 515, 1Z6 S.E. 112 (1934), where the
court held that an act of suicide while in an insane condition as a result of the defendant's
negligence is an involuntary act which does not break the causal connection between the
initial negligence and the suicide. "An intervening act which is involuntary and the result
of the primary negligence is not sufficient to dissever the chain of causation." 65 CJ.S.
Negligence § 111 (1950).
19. While there are no New York decisions which have held the defendant's negligence
to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's suicide, it would seem that if there is sufficient
evidence to warrant a finding that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff's insanity,
thus depriving him of his reason, and consequently causing suicide, the defendant will
be liable. See Koch v. Fox, 71 App. Div. 288, 298-99, 75 N.Y. Supp. 913, 920-21 (1st
Dep't 1902) (dictum), where the court said that it was not necessary to decide whether
the injury was the proximate cause of death as there was not sufficient evidence of insanity,
but it did indicate a willingness to hold defendant liable if there had been sufficient evidence. The court observed that an involuntary act of an insane man could not be an
efficient independent cause. See also McMahon v. City of New York, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190,
192 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 713, 159 N.Y.S.2d 266 (2d Dep't 1957), where
the court, while holding that the defendant was not liable for a suicide committed by a
sane man, did say: "This is not a case where one, who is injured, becomes insane, loses
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quent killing of another by one rendered insane through the defendant's negligence should be the same as that applied in determining the defendant's liability
for a subsequent suicide.
Of some interest are the workmen's compensation cases involving an employee
who commits suicide while in a state of insanity caused by an injury sustained
in the defendant's employ. In this type of case the defendant's liability need
not be predicated upon any negligence, but only upon an injury arising out of
and in the course of employment. 20 Thus, the decisions are of little value
in determining whether the foreseeability doctrine is applicable to the instant
case.2 1 However, the decisions are indicative of the courts' policy in regard to
causal connection, i.e., what consequences the court will deem caused by the
work-connected injury. The New York courts have held that if the injury
causes mental disease, 22 and because of this the plaintiff commits suicide, the
employer will be liable. 23 As in the negligence decisions, the courts reason
that an act committed in such a state of mind is not an independent intervening
force which disturbs24 the chain of causation between the initial injury and the
subsequent suicide.
In the case at hand the defendant's motion for a judgment on the pleadings
was granted. On such a motion the allegations in the complaint and the bill
of particulars are accepted as true and are construed liberally.2 5 They are to
2 6
be given every fair and reasonable intendment to support the complaint. The
court ruled as a matter of law that the shooting of the plaintiff was not a
natural and probable consequence that could have been foreseen. The decisions
cited by the court in support of its use of the foreseeability test do not involve
his control over his mind and body and takes his life." This would certainly indicate a
tendency by the court to find the defendant liable if such elements were present.
20. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 10.
21.

Obviously, where there is no negligence there are no consequences of a negligent

act to be foreseen, and furthermore, there is no negligent actor to foresee them.
22. In not mentioning the issue of the knowledge of the nature of the act, and in
requiring only a state of mental derangement at the time of the suicide, the New York
courts implicitly refute the majority view as stated in the Workmen's Compensation decision of In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915), which adopted the requirement set forth in the tort case of Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 183 Mass. 393,
399-400, 67 N.E. 424, 426 (1903) (dictum), that in order to hold the defendant liable
for the plaintiff's suicide, the plaintiff must have been impelled to act by an uncontrollable
impulse, or must have been acting in a state of frenzy or delirium and must not have known
the nature of his act.
23. See Maricle v. Glazier, 283 App. Div. 402, 128 N.Y.S.2d 148 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 307
N.Y. 738, 121 N.E.2d 549 (1954); Pushkarowitz v. A. & M. Kramer, 275 App. Div. 875,
88 N.Y.S.2d 885 (3d Dep't 1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 637, 90 N.E.2d 494 (1950); Sulfaro v.
Pellegrino & Sons, 2 App. Div. 2d 426, 156 N.Y.S.2d 411 (3d Dep't 1956).
24. 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 36.10 (1958).
25. Carmody, New York Practice § 462(b) (7th ed. 1956). See Green v. Doniger, 300
N.Y. 238, 90 N.E.2d 56 (1949); Didier v. MacFadden Publications, 299 N.Y. 49, 85
N.E.2d 612 (1949); Reppert v. Hunter, 180 App. Div. 680, 167 N.Y. Supp. 857 (4th
Dep't 1917).
26. Ibid.
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the liability of a defendant for the acts of a person insane by reason of the
defendant's negligence. 27 Might not the court have cited, with at least equal
validity and perhaps greater pertinence, those cases which have held that the
act of a person, insane or bereft of reason because of the defendant's negligence,
is involuntary, and as such does not disrupt the line of causation from negligence to subsequent injury?
In the instant case there was an interval of seven years between the defendant's negligent act and the injuries to the plaintiff.28 This lapse of time
certainly affords increased opportunity for the intervention of independent
causes to break the chain of causation from act to injury. However, as the
court observed, the passing of time, by itself, does not prevent the negligent
act from being the proximate cause of the subsequent injury.2 9 Thus, it would
seem that the allegations in the complaint concerning Springstead's mental
condition30 at the time of the shooting were, if not expressly so, at least by
implication, sufficient to establish the necessary mental condition required to
state a cause of action.
27. O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253 N.Y. 423, 171 N.E. 694 (1930) (injuries resulting from negligent blocking of street); Pasgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162
N.E. 99 (1928) (explosion on platform); Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N.Y. 73, 52 N.E. 679 (1899)
(explosion in building).
28. The N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 49(6) provides that an action to recover damages for a
negligent personal injury must be commenced within three years after the cause of action
has accrued. It would seem that this limitation is not applicable to the present case
as the cause of action did not accrue until the plaintiff was injured. Otherwise, a cause
of action might be barred before liability arose. See Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch
Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936) (dictum); Giles v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
281 App. Div. 95, 120 N.Y.S.2d 258 (3d Dep't 1953). Furthermore, the plaintiff was an
infant. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 60 extends the period of limitation by the period of infancy.
29. 11 Misc. 2d 243, 244, 173 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442. See Brush v. Lindsay, 210 App.
Div. 361, 367, 206 N.Y. Supp. 304, 308 (2d Dep't 1924), wherein it is stated that
time is immaterial except as it affords an increased opportunity for the assertion of
other intervening causes. See Restatement, Torts § 433, comment h (1934), where it is
stated that "where it is evident that the influence of the actor's negligence is still a substantial factor, mere lapse of time, no matter how long, is not sufficient to prevent it from
being the legal cause of the other's harm." See 1 Warren, Negligence in the New York
Courts § 3, at 37 (1941), where it is said that a substantial interval between the act and
the injury will not prevent the former from being regarded as the proximate cause of
the latter. The defendant in the instant case conceded that the time element was of no
significance upon the motion. See Reply Brief for Defendant, pp. 2, 3.
30. The prevailing view in regard to the required mental condition is set forth in the
Daniels case. See pp. 458-59 and note 16 supra. The New York workmen's compensation
cases require only mental disease at the time of the act, but it must be noted that the court
will not necessarily so hold in a tort case. In Koch v. Fox, 71 App. Div. 288, 75 N.Y.
Supp. 913 (1st Dep't 1902), a negligence case, the court indicated that if a defendant
was to be held liable for the plaintiff's suicide, the plaintiff must have acted under an
uncontrollable impulse, or he must not have known the nature and consequences of his
act. Nevertheless the allegations in the instant case were sufficient to state a cause of action
whether or not the court would follow the majority view or that taken by the New
York workmen's compensation decisions.
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Workmen's Compensation - Award for Disability Caused by Cerebral
Thrombosis Brought About by Mental and Emotional Strain. -Claimant
collapsed at her desk while organizing work for the next day. She had a
past history of hypertension and was of an overly conscientious nature, often
working harder than her duties demanded. The mental and emotional strain
of the work aggravated the hypertension and brought about the cerebral
thrombosis. An award made by the attorney-referee was affirmed by the
workmen's compensation commission and the circuit court. On appeal the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, with two justices dissenting, affirmed. The
court held that where the mental and emotional strain of an employee's work
aggravated a pre-existing hypertension, and such aggravation was a factor
contributing to the employee's disability, a workmen's compensation award
is proper. On a suggestion of error the court again, with two justices dissenting, affirmed. The court elaborated on its original opinion, and held that
the exertions which brought about the collapse included both bodily and
mental activities accompanied by stress and strain, all of which are physical
in nature. It was held, moreover, that an injury which develops gradually
over a reasonably definite and not too remote time is compensable. Insurance
Dep't v. Dinsmore, - Miss. -, 102 So. 2d 691, suggestion of error overruled,
No. 40,790, Miss. 1958.
It is quite generally held that to sustain a recovery under workmen's compensation the employment need not be the sole or even the primary cause of
the disability so long as it is at least a contributing factor.' Moreover, a preexisting disease or weakness will not bar a claim if it can be shown that the
employment aggravated 2 or combined with the previous infirmity to produce
disability.3
Mississippi is one of the majority of American jurisdictions4 that has an
"accidental injury ' 5 requirement in its workmen's compensation statute. The
basic ingredient of the accident idea is the unexpected 6 which may inhere
1. An attempt is sometimes made to compare the causation of the employment to the
disability in workmen's compensation with the "proximate cause" requirement of torts. This
is not very profitable. In torts the primary object is to fix fault and an injury
is not compensable unless it is first shown that there was an act or failure to act under
circumstances where harm was foreseeable. In workmen's compensation what is first sought
is not an act but a relationship between the work and the injury. Moreover lack of foreseeability is not a defense. See 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 6.50 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Larson]. Thus, if an employee is struck down by stray bullets fired by
persons having no connection with the employer, it is unthinkable that he would have a tort
action against his employer. But in some jurisdictions he has an action in workmen's
compensation. See, e.g., Baran's Case, 145 N.E.2d 726 (Sup. judicial Ct. Mass. 1957).
2. See, e.g., Dixie Pine Prod. Co. v. Bryant, 89 So. 2d 589 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1956); W. G.
Avery Body Co. v. Hall, 224 Miss. 51, 79 So. 2d 453 (1955); Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v.
Byrd, 215 Miss. 234, 60 So. 2d 645 (1952).
3. The injury must, however, arise out of and in the course of employment. 1 Larson
§ 12.20.
4. 1 id. § 37.10.
5. Miss. Code Ann. § 6998.02 (1952).
6. 1 Larson § 37.20.
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either in the cause of the disability or in the effect, 7 the latter being the
disability itself. Older decisions show that the courts were once prone to
look for the unexpected, that is, the "accidental" in the cause. In practice this
meant that a worker could not hope for a recovery unless something in the
nature of physical violence happened to him. 8 This was a stringent construction
of what was accepted as progressive" and "insurance like" legislation, and-in
most jurisdictions the requirements were soon liberalized. A manifestation of
the more liberal view of the accident requirement is seen in the so-called "breakage rule" 9 which holds that if the effect itself is some unexpected, that is drastic
and dramatic, change in the body structure such as a ruptured aorta, 10 a
slipped disc," or a cerebral hemorrhage,'1 2 this itself is enough of an accident
without looking for the unusual in the cause. The corollary of this theory
is, of course, that where the damage is something more subtle such as a coronary
(or cerebral) thrombosis or a myocardial infarction where something merely
clogs up or ceases to3 function instead of breaking, there must be something
unusual for a cause.1
To hold that a cerebral hemorrhage is more of an accident than a coronary
thrombosis is, of course, to enter the domain of medicine rather than law and on
rather dubious grounds.' 4 In the instant case the appellants attempted to
make such a distinction' 5 and the court, in its second opinion, found the dis7. Ibid.
8. In O'Connell v. Adirondack Elec. Power Corp., 193 App. Div. 582, 185 N.Y. Supp.
455 (3d Dep't 1920), the chief operator of an electrical system who had suffered a heart
attack from the exertion of restoring power after an electrical failure could not recover.
It was held that no accident had occurred because power failures and the strain of repairing them were to be expected as a normal part of the job.
9. 1 Larson § 38.20.
10. See, e.g., Kayser v. Erie County Highway Dep't, 276 App. Div. 789, 92 N.Y.S.2d 612
(3d Dep't 1949).
11. See, e.g., Pioli v. Crouse-Hinds Co., 281 App. Div. 737, 117 N.Y.S.2d 734 (3d Dep't
1952).
12. See, e.g., Cowart v. Pearl River Tung Co., 218 Miss. 472, 67 So. 2d 356 (1953).,
13. "A majority, but a much narrower majority, accept usual exertion as leading to
accidental injury when it involves coronary thrombosis, myocarditis, dilation of the heart
. . . and the like. Here there is fairly definite structural change in the body in most
instances, but the change is a little more subtle than the breaking of an arm or an aorta."

1 Larson § 38.30.
14. "[Als to the' great majority of heart failure cases it seems to be arbitrary and
artificial, and may be depended-upon to produce some of the most subtle medico-legal
distinctions ever attempted." 1 Larson §'38.73. The same author criticizes the whole theory
on four grounds: (1) British courts have not required it; (2) "unusual" is not synonymous
with "unexpected"; (3) there is seldom any yardstick to measure the usualness or unusualness of the exertion of any occupation; (4) mere unusualness does not' connote a greater
possibility of medical causation. Id. §§ 38.60-63, 38.81.
15. "It must be borne in mind that claimant suffered a cerebral clot as distinguished from
a cerebral hemorrhage, and there was no 'breaking, herniating, or letting go,' as was found
necessary in order to meet the 'accident' requirement in Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., et al., vs<
(sic.) Byrd (1952), 215 Miss. 234, 60 So. 2d 645. The Byrd decision necessarily implied
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tinction impractical and unrealistic.
The instant decision is one of a line
of cases which establish that Mississippi does not follow the "breakage rule"
and that it would permit recovery without the necessity of proving any unusual
exertion. 17 The courts have consistently regarded such a question as medical
rather than legal' 8 and, in each case, have simply affirmed the conclusion of
the triers of the fact provided it was supported by substantial evidence.' 9
The court's first opinion merely implied that the case was decided on the
question of physical exertion, but the second opinion stated that holding expressly.2 0 The court seemed in its first opinion to trace the cause of the
collapse to a specific incident; namely, the fact that before her collapse the
claimant was working "above and beyond the call of duty"2' either because
she would be absent the next day or because her superior was expected to
check the accounts. The second opinion makes it clear that it did not premise
its affirmance on that theory.2 2 This factor might have even been enough
to satisfy the "breakage test." However, the court seemed to be straining
slightly to decide the case on the question of emotional strain. Had it done
so it would have entered a new and relatively unexplored field of law. For while
a force or exertion of some nature by the employment causing a 'breaking, herniating, or
letting go'. In the instant case we have a clotting resulting from the inevitable and relentless formation of arteriosclerosis. The clot resulted not because of effort or exertion but
in spite of same. The effort or exertion would have deterred the clotting, if anything."
Brief for Appellants, pp. 56-57.
16. "The experience of other courts in this field demonstrates that any subtle medicolegal distinction between a cerebral hemorrhage and thrombosis would be impractical and
unrealistic." No. 40,790, Miss. Sup. Ct., 1958, p. 3.
17. See, e.g., Pennington v. Smith, - Miss. -, 100 So. 2d 569 (1958) (heart attack
from usual exertion); Schilling v. Mississippi State Forestry Comm'n, 226 Miss. 858, 85
So. 2d 562 (1956) (myocardial infarction); W. G. Avery Body Co. v. Hall, 224 Miss.
51, 79 So.2d 453 (1955) (hypertensive encephalopathy or "black-out").
18. See Southern Eng'r & Elec. Co. v. Chester, 226 Miss. 136, 83 So. 2d 811 (1955), as
modified, 226 Miss. 136, 84 So. 2d 535 (1956).
19. The substantial evidence requirements are construed very liberally in favor of the
claimant and include any evidence which is not inherently unreasonable or unbelievable.
See Pearson v. Dixie Elec. Power Ass'n, 219 Miss. 884, 70 So. 2d 6 (1954) ; Reyer v. Pearl
River Tung Co., 219 Miss. 211, 68 So. 2d 442 (1953). The Mississippi Workmen's Compensation statute provides that the commission shall be bound by none of the usual legal
rules as to the admissibility of evidence and that the testimony of the claimant, himself,
if corroborated by other circumstances, is sufficient to award compensation. Miss Code Ann.
§ 6998-28(a) (1952).
20. "Mrs. Dinsmore had a strenuous administrative job manifestly involving considerable
physical exertion, which phrase includes both bodily effort and mental activity." No.
40,790, Miss. Sup. Ct., 1958, p. 1. "Of course 'work activities' comprehend both bodily
and mental activities accompanied by stress and strain, all of which are physical in
nature, and all of which are present in this case." Id. at 4.
21. - Miss. -, -, 102 So. 2d 691, 694.
22. "Appellants are in error in interpreting our original controlling opinion as basing
compensability gpon a specific emotional disturbance of May 4, 1955, or of any prior
time period." No. 40,790, Miss. Sup. Ct., 1958, p. 4.
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the court has in the past allowed recovery for emotional injuries which were
the result of some prior physical injury.23 The instant case involved the reverse
situation-physical injury caused by emotional exertion.
There have been cases where awards were allowed for a disability resulting
from naked emotional stress. However, these cases almost invariably involved
some extraordinary event, such as an accident to another person, which was
found to have produced such fright or alarm in the claimant as to cause a
heart attack or other injury. 24 It should be noted that such disabilities ensued
from "accidental" causes, thus satisfying the accidental factor.
The instant case would have been novel had it allowed a recovery for what
would have been a usual emotional exertion of an occupation rather than
some extraordinary emotional strain.
The second opinion, however, makes it obvious that the court's initial use
of emotional strain as the only causative factor of the disability was dicta.
Those definitive statements, nevertheless, may well be persuasively employed
in the future by courts which may find themselves confronted with a case
which turns upon sheer emotional stress.
Certainly, as Professor Larson points out,25 workmen's compensation is a
field which is as much the province of the medical profession as the legal.
If the expert medical witnesses and the semi-expert commissioners can find a
causal connection between the emotional stress of the employment and the
injury, there is no reason for the courts to bar the way. From the "fright"
cases, it is clear enough that some courts have been willing to accept the basic
proposition that mental stress can be productive of compensable injury. Once
the courts have accepted disabilities resulting from mental strain as compensable, there seems to be no reason why they should be less willing to allow
compensation for injuries caused by routine mental exertion than by routine
physical exertion. As pointed out above, the "fright" cases present no
problem because there is an "accidental" quality in the cause of the injury.
However, in the case of physical exertion, the more liberal jurisdictions such
as Mississippi do not require that there be any such. "accidental" factor in
the cause if a causal connection can be established between the exertion and
the injury, such connection being regarded as a question of fact rather than
law. It is reasonable to apply the same principle to cases of emotional stress
and thus avoid an attempt to find something extraordinary in the exertion itself
if the triers of the fact can find a causal relation between it and the disability.
23. See Harper Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Harper, - Miss. -, 100 So. 2d 779 (1958),
where claimant suffered a heart attack from the nervous strain of the treatment for a burn
which was itself an industrial accident. See also Reyer v. Pearl River Tung Co., 219 Miss.
211, 68 So. 2d 442 (1953), where claimant's disability was partially psychological in nature
but which was brought about by a highway accident.
24. See, e.g., Roberts v. Dredge Fund, 71 Idaho 380, 232 P.2d 975 (1951) (heart attack
from nearby explosion); Reynolds v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 21 N.J. Super
528, 91 A.2d 435 (App. Div. 1952) (excitement of minor traffic accident causing cerebral
hemorrhage).
25. 1 Larson § 12.20.
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It has been said that emotions are too speculative to be posited as a basis
for compensation. It might also be questioned whether the medical acumen
of appellate tribunals is such, as to certify that the physical exertion in
any particular workmen's compensation case is not too speculative to serve
as the cause of compensable injury. Yet in such cases the question of medical causation is left to the triers of the fact. 27 Certainly there would seem
to be no reason to believe that the triers of the fact would be less capable of
reaching an intelligent determination in the case of emotional stress.
In addition to the unexpectedness criterion most jurisdictions have added
to the accident concept the requirement that the injury be traceable to a
definite time or occasion. 2 8 This too may apply to either the cause or
the effect.2 9 When, as in the instant case, there is a disability which
occurs fairly suddenly and which can be pinpointed to a specific point of
time, there is usually no problem. 8° When dealing with the instant type of
disability, even in those jurisdictions which follow the "breakage rule" and
look to the cause rather than the effect, there is still a question of degree
as to how definite is "definite." ' 31 The cause does not have to be confined to
a single instant but some reasonable latitude3 2 from a few hours to a few weeks
is allowed.
The cause of the instant injury occurred over a four month period and, although time is not too important in the instant case since there was a sudden
collapse, Mississippi has shown in the past that it is as liberal in the definiteness requirement as it has been in the unexpectedness requirement. Indeed,
26. Odell v. McGovern, 283 App. Div. 585, 129 N.Y.S.2d 115 (3d Dep't), aff'd per
curiam, 308 N.Y. 678, 124 N.E.2d 319 (1954).
27. See note 16 supra.
28. 1 Larson § 37.20.
29. 1 id. § 39.10.
30. "As to suddenness of result: in various situations an otherwise gradual kind of
deterioration may culminate in an obvious and sudden collapse or structural change whose
incidence can fix the date of accident clearly. Weeks of overwork and strain may lead to
coronary thrombosis. . . . An examination of the unsuccessful cases will reveal very few
in which a clean-cut collapse occurred." 1 id. § 39.30.
31. See, e.g., Masse v. James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56 (1950) (a
week of unusually hard work); Furtado v. American Export Airlines, Inc., 274 App. Div.
954, 83 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dep't 1948) (working seven days a week, twelve hours a day
for an unspecified time).
32. "Put negatively, this is merely to say that injury, to he accidental, need not be
instantaneous. If, then, the exposure or other cause is brief and sudden, there is usually
no further difficulty about time, and the consequence may be gradual deterioration. ...
The tendency to recognize longer and longer periods as sufficiently identifiable times of
accident has in some of the cited cases carried the permissible duration of the cause far
beyond a few hours or days, to weeks or even months in some instances." 1 Larson § 39.20.
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four months is rather conservative when compared with the time element in
some of the cases33 which have found favor with the court.3
33. In the instant case the court cited Hardin's Bakeries, Inc. v. Ranager, 217 Miss. 463,
64 So. 2d 705 (1953) where the claimant developed his disability somewhere over the
course of three years. In the latter case the court cited with approval a great many
foreign cases including Scobey v. Southern Lumber Co, 218 Ark. 671, 238 S.W.2d 640
(1951) (a year and a half) and Webb v. New Mexico Publishing Co., 47 N.M. 279, 141
P.2d 333 (1943) (six months).
34. It has been argued that once the unexpectedness test is met the further requirement
of definiteness is unnecessary. In Macklanburg-Duncan Co. v. Edwards, 311 P.2d 250,
253-54 (Okla. 1957), where the claimant developed neuritis from handling steel wool
over an eight year period, the court said: "The adjective 'accidental' is not a technical
term but a common one, whose popular usage would not necessarily mean that the words
'accidental injuries' indicated the existence of an accident, but rather the idea that the injury
was either unintended or unexpected."
'
Larson also points out that: "When the phrase accidental injury' is used, or the equivalent
phrase 'injury by accident,' there is no occasion as a matter of grammar, to read the phrase
as if it referred to 'an accident,' and then proceed to conduct a search for 'the accident'."

1 Larson § 37.20.

